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WHY ARE THERE TAX HAVENS?
ADAM H. ROSENZWEIG*
ABSTRACT
Recently, the issue of tax havens has risen to the fore of the fiscal
policy debate, with tax havens being singled out as the root cause of
many of the fiscal shortfalls plaguing the governments of the world.
Surprisingly, however, although there has been a fair amount of
literature on why tax havens are harmful to the modern interna-
tional tax regime, which countries become tax havens, and what
means are available to combat tax havens, there has been less written
specifically on the underlying question of why, notwithstanding all
these points, tax havens exist in the first place, or why they persist in
the face of such overwhelming criticism. This Article will fill that gap
by directly confronting the question: why are there tax havens?
To this end, this Article will propose for the first time that the
focus of the international tax laws of wealthier countries, such as the
United States, on capital neutrality—or making the flow of capital
across borders easier and cheaper—can actually create or exacerbate
the incentives necessary for poorer countries to act as tax havens.
This can be thought of as a “capital neutrality paradox” in that it is
the pursuit of capital neutrality—meant to increase worldwide
efficiency—which leads to more countries acting as tax havens,
effectively undermining worldwide efficiency. Consequently, pun-
ishing such countries in response would also prove counterpro-
ductive, because it would only exacerbate these incentives created by
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U.S. law in the first place. This “punishment paradox” in connection
with the “capital neutrality paradox” can fundamentally alter the
way in which the law should conceptualize and respond to the issue
of tax havens. Rather than ask “why are there tax havens?”, the
question would become “why pursue capital neutrality?” Rather than
ask “what can we do to punish tax havens?”, the question would
become “would punishment be effective?” Such an approach could not
only lead to a more efficient international tax regime, but could also
be the first step to finally answering the question of why there are tax
havens.
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INTRODUCTION
A raging debate on the perils of tax havens grips the nation.
Unscrupulous taxpayers indefinitely defer paying their fair share of
U.S. taxes by funneling their income through artificial companies in
tax haven countries. Tax havens threaten the long-term fiscal
health of the country, undermining the ability of the government to
address the pressing economic and social emergencies of the day,
and thus the integrity of the modern state itself. The alarm has
been raised, the gauntlet has been thrown; leading academics have
been decrying the use of tax havens as “tax witchcraft,”1 and even
the President of the United States himself has been imploring
Congress to act.2 Is this a description of the state of U.S. tax policy
in 2010? No—it describes international tax policy debate in the late
1950s and early 1960s. Yet, despite over fifty years of debate, schol-
arship, analysis, legislation, and regulation, if one simply listened
to the modern debate over tax havens, it would appear that little
progress has been made over that time.3
1. Stanley S. Surrey, The United States Taxation of Foreign Income, 1 J.L. & ECON. 72,
94 (1958) (“The proposal would thus end the tax witchcraft which makes Panama or
Liechtenstein or the Bahamas or even Canada the seat of enterprises of great magnitude
owned and operated by American corporations.”); see also LAWRENCE B. KRAUSE & KENNETH
W. DAM, THE BROOKINGS INST., FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INCOME 13-19 (1964).
2. Special Message to the Congress on Taxation, 1 PUB. PAPERS 290, 295 (Apr. 20, 1961)
[hereinafter Kennedy’s Special Message] (“[D]eferral has served as a shelter for tax escape
through the unjustifiable use of tax havens.”); see also Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened
to Subpart F? U.S. CFC Legislation After the Check-The-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 185,
188 (2005).
3. See, e.g., DAVID L. BRUMBAUGH & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REFORM
OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: ALTERNATIVES (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs
.com/rpts/RL34115_20070731.pdf; Martin A. Sullivan, News Analysis: Will Obama Impose
Sanctions on Tax Havens?, 121 TAX NOTES 1346 (2008); Jackie Calmes & Edmund L.
Andrews, Obama Asks Curb on Use of Havens To Reduce Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at
A1 (“‘It's a tax code that makes it all too easy for a number—a small number of individuals
and companies to abuse overseas tax havens to avoid paying any taxes at all,’ the president
said.”); Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, Statement on Introducing the Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act, Part I (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.
cfm?id=308945.
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What can explain this lack of progress?4 It cannot simply be
attributable to myopia, inertia, or laziness; after all, the United
States has enacted or fundamentally revised comprehensive anti-
tax-haven legislation in 1962,5 1976,6 1986,7 and 1993,8 and it is
currently the driving factor behind most international tax policy.9
Nor can it be a problem unique to the idiosyncrasies of U.S. tax
policy, since tax havens have plagued most of the developed coun-
tries of the world—as evidenced by the recent “name and shame”
campaign against tax havens led by the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).10 Yet tax havens not only
arise and persist in the face of such seemingly overwhelming attack
and criticism, they seem to flourish.11
4. See Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About
Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 497 (1999)
(“[D]eferral is a topic that has long been on the reform agenda. There has been extensive and
continuous debate since 1961 (when President Kennedy proposed to end deferral for most
CFCs).”). Some have claimed that the tax haven “problem” significantly predates the tax
haven debates of the 1950s, and even the modern income tax regime itself. See, e.g., Terence
Dwyer & Deborah Dwyer, Transparency Versus Privacy: Reflections on OECD Concepts of
Harmful Tax Competition, in INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION 259, 262-63 (Rajiv Biswas ed.,
2002) (quoting Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776)). In fact, at least one book attributes the modern tax haven phenomenon
indirectly to the 1066 Norman conquest of England. See RICHARD ANTHONY JOHNS, TAX
HAVENS AND OFFSHORE FINANCE: A STUDY OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 78
(1983) (describing how the collapse of the Norman Empire in 1204 led to the annexation of the
Channel Islands under the British Crown in 1254 and the granting of the Charter to the
People of Jersey, Guernsey, Sark and Alderney of 1341 and 1394, which then led to the fiscal
autonomy of the Channel Islands).
5. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
6. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
7. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874.
8. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
9. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Obama International Tax Plan: A Major Step
Forward 4 (U. Mich. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 149,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400624.
10. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING
GLOBAL ISSUE 8 (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/1/1904184.pdf [here-
inafter OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION].
11. It is as if only the names change: in the early 1960s it was Switzerland which was held
up as the epitome of an abusive tax haven, see Kennedy’s Special Message, supra note 2, at
295, while in the early 1980s it was the Netherlands Antilles, see Craig M. Boise & Andrew
P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in Offshore Financial Intermediation:
The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 377, 379 (2009), and by the early
twenty-first century the title had passed to the Cayman Islands, see Calmes & Andrews,
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Accordingly, the issue of combating tax havens has once again
risen to the fore of the fiscal policy debate, being singled out by
institutions such as the OECD and G20 as the root cause of many
of the fiscal shortfalls plaguing the governments of the world.12 To
this end, an otherwise unassuming five-story building located in
Grand Cayman named Ugland House has found itself in the eye of
the most recent tax haven storm.13 What distinguishes Ugland
House from other buildings is not its architecture or its name, but
rather that it houses over 18,000 corporations, mostly owned by U.S.
taxpayers.14 Consequently, a renewed—and familiar—chorus has
arisen: Ugland House is a mere sham, aiding and abetting U.S.
companies from paying their “fair share” of U.S. taxes. This
obviously must be the case, the argument goes—after all, if 18,000
corporations truly were headquartered at Ugland House, wouldn’t
it need a bigger parking lot?15
Contrary to this popular sentiment that Ugland House represents
a den of tax iniquity for dishonest taxpayers to evade their fair
share of U.S. taxes, this Article will contend that it can more
properly be thought of as a symptom of the unintentional incentives
created and perpetuated by the modern international tax regime
supra note 3. See also Lynnley Browning, Swiss Deal with I.R.S. May Hide Some Tax Cheats,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2009, at B3; Rowena Mason, Bankrupt Cayman Islands To Get £38m
Bail-Out, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 1, 2009, at 4, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/6248284/Bankrupt-Cayman-Islands-to-get-38m-bail-
out.html (“It is unfair that when you see an article about tax havens it's always illustrated
by a palm tree, never a Swiss Alp.”) (quoting Tony Travers, Director of the Cayman Islands
Financial Services Association).
12. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the
OECD to the G20, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 19 (2010). 
13. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CAYMAN ISLANDS: BUSINESS AND TAX
ADVANTAGES ATTRACT U.S. PERSONS AND ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES EXIST (2008), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08778.pdf.
14. Id. at 3. 
15. See The Rachel Maddow Show (MSNBC television broadcast May 4, 2009), available
at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30641410/ns/msnbc_tv-rachel_maddow_show/ (“[Ugland
House is] home to the fake headquarters of 18,857 companies that want to look like they’re
headquartered there in order to avoid paying taxes somewhere else. If there really were
18,857 businesses there, don’t you think the parking lot would be a little bigger?”); cf. The
Colbert Report: Better Know a District—Delaware’s Mike Castle (Comedy Central television
broadcast Nov. 9, 2009), available at http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/
255199/november-09-2009/better-know-a-district---delaware-s-mike-castle (showing Stephen
Colbert’s satirical description of the single story building on 1209 North Orange Street,
Wilmington, Delaware, that holds over 200,000 business addresses). 
2010] WHY ARE THERE TAX HAVENS? 929
embodied in the laws of countries such as the United States. How
can this be the case? Surprisingly, although there has been a fair
amount of literature on why tax havens are harmful to the modern
international tax regime,16 which countries become tax havens,17
and what means are available to combat tax havens,18 there has
been little written in the legal literature specifically on the underly-
ing theoretical question of why, notwithstanding all these points,
tax havens exist in the first place, or why they persist in the face of
such overwhelming criticism.19 This Article will begin to fill that gap
by directly confronting the question: why are there tax havens?
At first this seems like an exceedingly obvious question—tax
havens exist because countries use their tax laws to attract busi-
16. See, e.g., STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND
SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REPORT ON TAX HAVEN ABUSES: THE
ENABLERS, THE TOOLS, AND SECRECY 9 (Comm. Print 2006); OECD, HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION, supra note 10, at 8; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and
the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (2000) [hereinafter Avi-
Yonah, Globalization].
17. See Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax
Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1058 (2009).
18. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L.
REV. 259 (2003); Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 99 (2009); Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International Tax: A New Approach
to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (2007);
Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335 (2001); Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?:
International Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 155 (2008) [hereinafter Ring,
Sovereignty Debate]; Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in
U.S. Tax Policy?, 60 TAX L. REV. 155 (2007).
19. This is not to say that little is written as to why countries might want to be tax
havens, only that such discussions tend to rely on assumptions as to the reasons for such
behavior or on the empirical fact of the presence of tax havens rather than on the underlying
theoretical question of why there are tax havens. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra
note 16, at 1576-77; OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 10, at 8. Similarly, at
least one book has suggested that certain tax haven activity was explicitly encouraged by
wealthier countries. See J.C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL TAX
REGULATION 24 (2006) (discussing Britain’s conclusion that Vanuatu is “a natural tax haven”).
Both contrast to the theoretical question of whether U.S. law can create or exacerbate
incentives for poorer countries to become tax havens, however. This question has recently
begun to be raised in the political economy literature, but it mostly focuses on the inability
of countries to unilaterally cope with tax competition, taking sovereignty as a given rather
than establishing a broader theoretical analysis of the incentives toward tax competition. See
Markus Leibrecht & Thomas Rixen, Double Tax Avoidance and Tax Competition for Mobile
Capital, in INTERNATIONAL TAX COORDINATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE ON
VIRTUES AND PITFALLS 61, 69-70 (Martin Zagler ed., 2010). 
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ness, either as a means to increase economic growth or to maximize
tax revenue, or both.20 The problem with this answer is that the
literature has fairly well established that it must either be incorrect
or irrational: first, using taxes as a means to compete with other
countries over business investment generally does not benefit a
country’s long-term economic growth,21 and second, tax havens
generally have not adopted revenue-maximizing rates or otherwise
engaged in theoretically revenue-maximizing behavior.22 So are tax
havens merely acting irrationally and contrary to their own long-
term economic and fiscal interests, perhaps captured by special
interest groups indifferent to the harms they are imposing on the
world, or is some other underlying phenomenon at play?
This Article proposes the latter, focusing on the role that the
fundamental policy superstructure of the international tax laws of
countries such as the United States can play in creating or exacer-
bating all or part of the incentives necessary for countries to act as
tax havens. In other words, what has been missing from the tax
haven debate is the observation that the focus of most developed
countries’ international tax law on “capital neutrality”—in essence
20. See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, Who Is Making International Tax Policy?: International
Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649, 702 n.249
(2010) [hereinafter Ring, Power Players]; Timothy V. Addison, Note, Shooting Blanks: The
War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703, 711 (2009) (“A state becomes a tax
haven for one undeniable reason: to attract capital to help promote growth in its financial
industry.”).
21. This is because competition leads to a “race to the bottom” as compared to a world
without competition in which investment would be made anyway. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, supra note 16, at 1646 (“In summary, from the perspective of a typical
developing country, the revenue loss from granting targeted tax holidays appears unlikely to
be adequately offset by the benefits flowing from the resulting investment.”). Thus, isolated
successes such as Ireland do not necessarily prove tax haven behavior is effective, but rather
that tax competition leads to a worldwide loss of revenue and growth with respect to
investments that would have been made anyway. Id. at 1646; see also Avi Nov, The “Bidding
War” To Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX REV.
835, 867-71 (2006); James R. Hines, Jr., Do Tax Havens Flourish? 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 10936, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=625567.
22. See, e.g., U.N. CTR. ON TRANSNAT’L CORPS., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40 (1974) (prepared by
Carl. S. Shoup) [hereinafter UNCTC, 1974 REPORT] (“It can be shown that the minimum tax
bill occurs when the [less-developed country is] tax rate is exactly one-half the United States
rate.”); James R. Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice, Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and
American Business, 109 Q.J. ECON. 149 (1994) (finding the optimal tax haven rate between
5-8 percent).
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minimizing double taxation on cross-border business and invest-
ment23—can itself create or exacerbate incentives for other countries
to engage in tax competition.
At first this appears counterintuitive: if U.S. law is truly neutral
as to capital, how can it shape incentives for other countries to
compete against the United States over capital? Answering this
question requires revisiting some of the normative arguments sup-
porting capital neutrality in the first place, primarily the concern
with mitigating double taxation, that is, two countries imposing tax
on the same item of income. By doing so, the theory goes, capital
will more easily cross borders, increasing gains from trade and
making every country better off.24 The problem is that there is a cost
to making capital more mobile in addition to a benefit: the more
mobile capital becomes, the more easily countries can use tax
incentives to attract such capital.25 In other words, one country
focusing on double taxation relief can make tax competition a
cheaper and more readily available instrument for other countries
to attract capital.26
This could be thought of as a form of “capital neutrality paradox”
in that it is precisely the pursuit of capital neutrality by a country
such as the United States—intended to increase worldwide effi-
ciency—which could lead to greater incentives for other countries to
engage in tax competition, effectively undermining worldwide
efficiency.27 This does not mean that the costs of capital neutrality
23. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. To this end, cooperation among
countries—in other words, division of the worldwide tax base—has been seen as a secondary
step. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 16, at 1650; see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 382-87 (2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, International Redistribution].
24. See, e.g., Eckhard Janeba, Corporate Income Tax Competition, Double Taxation
Treaties, and Foreign Direct Investment, 55 J. PUB. ECON. 311 (1995).
25. See, e.g., Ring, Power Players, supra note 20, at 702 n.251.
26. Cf. Leibrecht & Rixen, supra note 19, at 62.
27. Alternatively, this could be thought of as the tax law exacerbating wealth disparities
rather than as a stand-alone legal paradox. Cf. PETER J. MONTIEL, OBSTACLES TO INVESTMENT
IN AFRICA: EXPLAINING THE LUCAS PARADOX (2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
np/seminars/eng/2006/rppia/pdf/montie.pdf (arguing that a number of possible reasons exist
to explain why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries, including lower productivity,
lower human capital, information frictions, and low levels of domestic financial development).
This Article will utilize the term “capital neutrality paradox” as shorthand to capture both
concepts.
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will outweigh the benefits, or that all countries will act on the
incentive to engage in tax competition. Rather, the capital neutral-
ity paradox suggests that there are incentives within the interna-
tional tax regime toward tax competition which have until now not
been taken into account. 
Even taking the incentives of the capital neutrality paradox as
true, however, they would be irrelevant to the analysis of why there
are tax havens if the benefits of capital mobility, such as gains from
trade, were always greater than the benefits from tax competition
for all countries involved. Accordingly, analyzing why there are tax
havens necessitates asking the next question: whether there could
in fact be any countries for which the incentives toward tax com-
petition created by the capital neutrality paradox would be more
appealing than gains from trade. Answering this question requires
revisiting one of the (mostly unquestioned) assumptions underlying
the modern international tax regime: that capital will flow to its
highest and best use unless the tax law somehow prevents it from
doing so. The empirical evidence consistently demonstrates pre-
cisely the opposite, however: that developing countries attract
disproportionately lower amounts of capital than predicted under
any version of neoclassical economic theory.28
Consequently, for certain (mostly poorer) countries, capital flows
absent tax competition will almost always be insufficient to provide
28. The phenomenon of capital not flowing to poorer countries in the amounts expected
under the theory is generally referred to as the “Lucas Paradox,” after Nobel-Prize-winning
economist Robert Lucas. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Why Doesn’t Capital Flow From Rich to
Poor Countries?, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 92 (1990); see also Laura Alfaro, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan
& Vadym Volosovych, Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries? An Empirical
Investigation, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 347 (2008); Michael A. Clemens & Jeffrey G. Williamson,
Where Did British Foreign Capital Go? Fundamentals, Failures, and the Lucas Paradox: 1870-
1913 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8028, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8028; Daniel Cohen & Marcelo Soto, Why Are Poor Countries
Poor? A Message of Hope Which Involves the Resolution of a Becker/Lucas Paradox (Ctr. for
Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 3528, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=338160. Others have posited that the issue is more of a puzzle than a paradox,
because not only does capital fail to flow to developing countries as expected, but capital also
has been flowing in the wrong direction, that is, from developing countries to developed
countries. See, e.g., Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Olivier Jeanne, Capital Flows to Developing
Countries: The Allocation Puzzle (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13602,
2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13602; Jiandong Ju & Shang-Jin Wei, A
Solution to Two Paradoxes of International Capital Flows (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 12668, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12668.
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an adequate tax base to satisfy any definition of minimal revenue
needs through their tax systems. Therefore, as wealthier countries
adopt laws freeing capital to move more easily across borders, tax
competition becomes an increasingly cheaper and more attractive
way for poorer countries to attract tax base. Although the adoption
of capital neutrality by wealthier countries does not cause the lack
of tax base in poorer countries, it does provide, in effect, a powerful
tool for these countries to attract capital otherwise unavailable to
them.
The novelty of the capital neutrality paradox is not the concession
that tax competition may be an inevitable part of a messy real-world
international tax regime,29 but rather that the perceived problems
of tax competition over the years, and across jurisdictions, can be
thought of theoretically not as isolated incidents of taxpayers
exploiting loopholes or poorer countries acting irrationally, but as
part of a larger set of disparate incentives for capital to locate in
wealthier as opposed to poorer countries.30 This is not merely
because there are rich and poor countries in the world, but rather
(in part if not in whole) due to countries such as the United States
focusing on capital neutrality as their dominant international tax
policy goal, thereby creating incentives toward tax competition.31
Only once these incentives are taken into account will it be possible
to offset them in any meaningful way.
For example, the legal literature has for the most part concluded
that punishing countries that engage in some forms of tax competi-
tion is an appropriate and desirable policy response.32 If, however,
29. See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, Can Income from Capital Be Taxed?: An International
Perspective, in TAXING CAPITAL INCOME 211, 217 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 2007) (“Taxation
of transnational income would be easier without tax havens, but they probably cannot be
eliminated.”); see also Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, Agglomeration, Integration, and
Tax Harmonisation, 48 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (2004); Signe Krogstrup, Standard Tax
Competition and Increasing Returns, 10 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 547 (2008).
30. See, e.g., Alfaro et al., supra note 28, at 347.
31. Of course, a country does not become a tax haven solely due to the incentives of the
capital neutrality paradox, nor could all countries which might desire to engage in tax
competition successfully do so. Rather, the capital neutrality paradox provides that there are
incentives in the international tax regime for certain countries to engage rationally in tax
competition, which have so far been underappreciated in the literature. Cf. Leibrecht & Rixen,
supra note 19, at 62. 
32. See Dean, supra note 18, at 929 (“For the OECD, the economic efficiency implications
of tax flight provided both a normative rationale for their anti-tax haven initiative and a key
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the capital neutrality paradox is correct, punishment may not only
be ineffective in achieving its stated goal of reducing tax competi-
tion, but could actually be counterproductive, precisely because it
could drive tax competition to other, more pernicious forms. While
there is a theoretical limit to such alternatives, the literature has
detailed numerous ways in which poorer countries can exploit the
“neutral” tax laws of wealthier countries to create negative effective
tax rates, thus making tax competition virtually limitless.33 In this
manner, the more tax competition is punished in the world of the
capital neutrality paradox, the more intense, and harmful, the tax
competition must become for tax haven countries to continue to
meet their minimum revenue needs. Because it is precisely by
exploiting the “neutral” baseline of countries such as the United
States which makes this possible, punishment layered on top of a
regime focused on capital neutrality would lead to more intensified
tax competition, the precise opposite of the intended result. This
could be thought of as a form of “punishment paradox”: punishing
tax competition in a world with the capital neutrality paradox could
actually lead to increased, and more intense, competition.
Given the combination of the capital neutrality paradox and the
punishment paradox, the question becomes not why tax havens
stubbornly seem to persist in the international tax regime, but
rather to what extent tax havens are a function of incentives created
or exacerbated by the focus on capital neutrality and punishment.34
This inquiry represents a significant departure from previous ap-
proaches to conceptualizing tax havens, focusing not on the symp-
toms of the international tax regime—such as the 18,000-plus
reason the OECD believed the initiative would succeed.”); cf. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra
note 16, at 1646 (“Whenever competition from other countries drives a developing country to
provide tax incentives, eliminating the competition does not hurt the developing country and
may aid its revenue-raising efforts, assuming it can attract investment by other means.”).
33. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79, 117 (2009).
34. In other words, the focus of international tax law should be on finding an optimal
balance between capital neutrality and tax havens, rather than insisting on the impossible
ideal of both achieving pure neutrality and eradicating tax competition. See, e.g., Marko
Köthenbürger, Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization, 9 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 391 (2002)
(concluding that tax base equalization can be optimal under certain assumptions).
2010] WHY ARE THERE TAX HAVENS? 935
corporations based at the Ugland House—but rather on the
underlying legal incentives driving these perceived symptoms.35
Taken from this perspective, the capital neutrality paradox and
punishment paradox can offer new insights into old debates. To this
end, Part I of this Article will describe the political economy models
of tax competition, demonstrating why the traditional theory of tax
havens considered tax havens to be harmful to the international
regime and how recent political economy literature has begun to
challenge this conclusion on multiple fronts. In particular, Part I
will demonstrate that the political economy models conclude that
there is no one inherent solution, but rather that the law itself plays
a crucial role in defining and shaping the incentives which can lead
to either cooperation or competition. Next, Part II will introduce
modern international tax law into the political economy models
described in Part I, revealing that the focus on neutrality in the tax
laws can lead to the rise of the capital neutrality paradox—meaning
the incentive for poorer countries to act as tax havens—and that the
use of punishment in response can lead to the rise of the punish-
ment paradox—meaning more tax havens, more intense competi-
tion, or both, in the face of increasing punishment. Part III will
reframe the international tax law debate in light of these paradoxes,
demonstrating that they can better explain both historical experi-
ences of dealing with tax havens and the theoretical harms and
benefits of tax havens on the international regime.
Finally, Part IV will discuss novel prescriptive solutions to U.S.
law arising as a result of the factors illuminated above, introducing
a “punishment plus” theory of combating tax havens. This theory
35. Correspondingly, proposals that merely shift from one form of capital neutrality to
another, such as proposals to move to a European-style territorial tax system or to more
aggressively widen the net of the current U.S. antideferral system, may be better or worse
than current law but would not necessarily address the capital neutrality paradox. Cf.
Fleming et al., supra note 33; David S. Miller, Unintended Consequences: How U.S. Tax Law
Encourages Investment in Offshore Tax Havens (Oct. 19, 2010) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684716). For example, at least one book attributes the
rise of tax havens to the “place of management” rules for corporate residency adopted by the
United Kingdom, see RONEN PALAN, RICHARD MURPHY & CHRISTIAN CHAVAGNEUX, TAX
HAVENS: HOW GLOBALIZATION REALLY WORKS 112-14 (2010), while others blame the opposite
United States rule for corporate residency, the “place of incorporation” rule. See, e.g., Michael
J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and
Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 320-22 (2001). 
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incorporates the fiscal needs of other countries into modern U.S. tax
doctrine, not out of notions of fairness or distributive justice, but
rather to mitigate the incentives toward tax competition already
built into the regime. In particular, Part IV will describe how
indirect fiscal transfers could be built into the Internal Revenue
Code through the foreign tax credit “basket” rules and other similar
rules. This solution would help mitigate the pressure on poorer
countries to engage in tax competition without undermining the
fundamental structure or underlying policies of the international
tax regime itself, potentially resulting in less competition and more
revenue for all countries. In other words, tax competition as an
inefficient and hidden form of fiscal transfer could be replaced with
a more direct and efficient form of fiscal transfer. Punishment could
then be used as a scalpel to surgically excise recalcitrant behavior
from the system rather than as a sledgehammer, destroying all in
its path.36
I. THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME: THE PROBLEMS OF DOUBLE
TAXATION AND TAX COMPETITION
The traditional approach to analyzing the international tax laws
of the United States—as with most if not all tax laws—has been to
think of international tax in terms of its impact on the behavior of
those individuals or businesses obligated to pay the tax. This
approach focuses on balancing two underlying normative goals:
maximizing the economic efficiency of the law or maximizing the
equity of the law.37 Due to the open nature of the international tax
system, however, the traditional efficiency/equity balance under-
36. Cf. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It
is, I submit, sheer nonsense to agree with the Secretary that all bank records of every citizen
‘have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings.’
That is unadulterated nonsense unless we are to assume that every citizen is a crook, an
assumption I cannot make. Since the banking transactions of an individual give a fairly
accurate account of his religion, ideology, opinions, and interests, a regulation impounding
them and making them automatically available to all federal investigative agencies is a
sledge-hammer approach to a problem that only a delicate scalpel can manage.”).
37. See, e.g., Boris Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do Misallocations
Drive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735 (1979); Richard Schmalbeck, The Death of
the Efficiency-Equity Tradeoff?: A Commentary on McMahan’s The Matthew Effect and
Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1143 (2004).
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taken in the domestic context requires a slightly different analysis.38
For example, should tax liabilities, if any, imposed by another
country influence how we analyze the efficiency of U.S. tax laws? If
so, how? Should the same rule apply to two taxpayers who are
otherwise similarly situated except that one operates in a foreign
country? Would this unnecessarily defer the sovereign taxing power
of the United States to the whims of other countries?
These problems can be illustrated through a relatively simple, yet
quite realistic, example. Assume a small software business in the
United States initially sells its software only within the United
States. As the company begins to grow, potential customers from
Canada contact the company and request to purchase the software.
The company has to decide whether to open a small office in
Canada, which would allow it to sell to local customers more cheaply
and access the broader Canadian market, or to continue simply to
take orders from its U.S. office and to ship software to Canada.
Assume that if the company opens an office in Canada it would have
to pay income tax in Canada in addition to the income tax owed to
the United States, while without such an office it would not. Absent
any relief, this “double taxation” could dissuade the company from
expanding to Canada, even if opening the office would otherwise be
better for the overall business.
In economic terms, the imposition of two taxes in this manner
creates “deadweight loss” by distorting economic decision making of
taxpayers as compared to a utility-maximizing world absent taxes.39
The problem presented by this situation is how to fix double
taxation when there are two sovereign countries involved. In other
words, the United States cannot simply force Canada to forego
taxing the business, nor can Canada do the same to the United
States. Rather, unilateral or negotiated means of dividing the tax
base must be developed so as to remove the distortion of double
taxation while working within the constraints of the open economy. 
38. See ABA Task Force on Financial Reform, Report of the Task Force on International
Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649 (2006) [hereinafter ABA International Tax Reform Report];
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Commentary, 53 TAX L. REV. 167, 171 (2000).
39. See Joel Slemrod, Effect of Taxation with International Capital Mobility, in UNEASY
COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 115-16 (Henry J. Aaron et
al. eds., 1988).
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There are generally two ways in which a country, such as the
United States, could unilaterally mitigate double taxation. First, the
United States could simply exempt income which is subject to
taxation in other jurisdictions. In this manner, U.S. investors would
not be subject to double taxation, but rather would be subject to only
the local, or “host,” country tax. Alternatively, the United States
could continue to tax income earned in foreign jurisdictions, but
subtract from the tax owed to the United States any taxes paid to
foreign countries, or in other words grant a “credit.” In this manner,
the taxpayer would only pay tax to the United States if the U.S. tax
exceeded the amount of tax paid to the host country.
There is, to say the least, no consensus on which form of double
taxation relief is optimal from an international tax perspective.40
There has been a consensus for the most part, however, that
countries should adopt some means of double tax relief, either
unilaterally by granting a foreign tax credit or exempting foreign
source income, on the one hand, or bilaterally through a tax treaty
on the other.41 Regardless which of these methodologies is chosen,
however, what is relatively clear is that double taxation relief has
provided the normative foundation of most if not all of the modern
international tax regime.42
This consensus has been based primarily on the leading public
finance model for the taxation of capital, which provides that taxes
should be structured so as to minimize the harm to the worldwide
production of goods;43 in this manner, the theory goes, total produc-
40. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1108-09 (1997).
41. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, TREASURY DEP'T, THE DEFERRAL OF INCOME EARNED THROUGH
U.S. CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: A POLICY STUDY, at xi n.14 (2000), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/subpartf.pdf [hereinafter SUBPART F
REPORT] (“The foreign tax credit reflects the fundamental tax policy decision made by most
countries, in order to prevent double taxation, to give up the right to tax their residents to the
extent that the country where the income is sourced imposes tax and to reserve the right to
tax their residents to the extent that the source country does not impose tax.”).
42. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal
for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Structure of
International Taxation]; Brauner, supra note 18, at 294.
43. See, e.g., Christopher Bliss, The Design of Fiscal Reforms in Revenue-Constrained
Developing Countries, 102 ECON. J. 940, 942 (1992) (“The modern theory of public finance in
developing countries begins with the paper by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971).”); Michael Keen
& Hannu Piekkola, Simple Rules for the Optimal Taxation of International Capital Income,
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tion grows and all countries are better off—that is, the tax would be
Pareto-optimal.44 Economic theory provides that deviations from
this baseline are inappropriate because they would result in an
inefficient allocation of worldwide resources, making all countries
worse off.45 In other words, worldwide efficient allocation of re-
sources helps all countries, while anything which distorts the
neutral allocation of resources makes everyone worse off, at least in
the long run.46 
99 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 447, 447-48 (1997).
44. This is referred to as the “Diamond-Mirrlees” model. See Peter A. Diamond & James
A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public Production I: Production Efficiency, 61 AM. ECON.
REV. 8 (1971); Peter A. Diamond & James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public
Production II: Tax Rules, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1971).
45. See, e.g., Harry Grubert, Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade, and Electronic Commerce:
Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems, 58 TAX L. REV. 149, 179
(2005). Grubert states:
Consider, therefore, a domestic product that is a perfect substitute for a good
produced in a low-tax country. Also, to make matters completely simple, assume
that in both countries (tangible) capital is the only input needed to produce the
good but efficiency can differ between countries. The high-tax location, the
United States, is more efficient in this industry, with a requirement of x units
of capital per unit of output. The low-tax country requirement is y units per unit
of output with y > x. The low-tax location, however, may have an overall cost
advantage when taxes are considered. If t1 is the U.S. rate and t2 is the foreign
rate, then the foreign location will produce the good if xr/(1-t1) > yr/(1-t2), where
r is the worldwide required after-corporate-tax return.... If the above inequality
holds, all production of the good will take place in the low-tax country, some of
which will be exported to the high-tax country.
.... 
This equilibrium is clearly inefficient from both a national and world
perspective. The capital is more productive in the United States.
Id. at 179. There is a literature that claims tax competition is valuable in that it limits the
ability of countries to become “Leviathans,” that is, to grow unabated. See Anthony C. Infanti,
Spontaneous Tax Coordination: On Adopting a Comparative Approach To Reforming the U.S.
International Tax Regime, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1105, 1150-53 (2002). Opponents of tax
competition reject this theory on the grounds that tax competition leads to reduced growth
and revenue for all—that is, there is a negative externality. Id. The externality theory of tax
competition is the starting point for this Article because it has served as the basis for most
anti-tax-haven efforts.
46. This is in contrast to legal competition, which is often justified as beneficial for all
parties involved in that it can lead to a sort of “race to the top” where jurisdictions offer
increasingly beneficial provisions to attract people or investors. See generally ERIN A. O’HARA
& LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (2009); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future
of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1277 (2008). For a discussion of how tax
competition can distort legal competition, see Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate
Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (2008).
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Because tax competition, or using tax laws to artificially attract
business and investment, runs contrary to this principle, the theory
also provides that tax competition must be detrimental not only to
the country losing the investment, but also to the competing country
as well.47 Accordingly, some have taken the next step, contending
that the international tax regime should focus not only on relief
from double taxation but also on double nontaxation, that is, income
escaping tax altogether solely as a result of crossing borders.48
Although there are multiple ways in which double nontaxation can
occur, the primary target has been countries which intentionally
exempt capital from tax in one way or another—in other words, tax
havens.49
Under this approach, tax havens must be bad because they distort
economic decision making and are therefore inefficient.50 Unlike
double taxation, however, which can be resolved unilaterally by the
home country through the granting of a foreign tax credit or
exempting foreign income from tax, the presence of tax havens in
the international regime cannot be overcome unilaterally; pursuant
to almost any theory of sovereignty, the United States cannot force
another country to change its tax laws solely to prevent U.S.
47. See, e.g., John Douglas Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane
or Boon, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1065, (2004); John Douglas Wilson, Trade, Capital Mobility, and
Tax Competition, 95 J. POL. ECON. 835 (1987). This theory of tax competition relies
substantially on the Ricardian concept of comparative advantage. Under this theory, all
countries are better off specializing in their comparative advantage and trading with each
other rather than attempting to be self-sufficient. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE
OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 10-11 (6th ed. 2003). For an overview of the theoretical
models regarding the benefits of international trade, see generally MIKE W. PENG, GLOBAL
BUSINESS 124-47 (2009). For a general discussion of the efficiency considerations in
structuring tax laws, see RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 289-94 (4th ed. 1984).
48. See SUBPART F REPORT, supra note 41, at 99 (“[A]ny such regime should avoid rules
that may lead to international double taxation or double non-taxation or that radically
increase administrative burdens.”).
49. So far any attempt at a more formal definition of “tax haven” seems to devolve into
some form of totality of the circumstances analysis, see OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION,
supra note 10, at 20-21, or, even worse, an “I know it when I see it” approach, see PALAN ET
AL., supra note 35, at 45. It is for this reason that this Article will not attempt to define what
constitutes a “tax haven.” Instead, this Article will assume that a tax haven is any country
which engages in tax competition to attract capital. This assumption is used solely as a basis
to further the incentives-based analysis discussed in this Article.
50. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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taxpayers from avoiding U.S. tax liability.51 Instead, the answer
that has developed over time has been for the countries harmed by
tax havens—primarily large developed countries—to “combat” tax
havens by punishing the havens themselves or the taxpayers
investing in them.52
This narrative, which has served as the basis of most of the
modern anti-tax-haven efforts, has begun to be challenged on
multiple fronts in the literature, however.53 The primary thrust of
this challenge has been a recent focus on the limitations of compara-
tive advantage theory, the theory that all countries are better off if
each country specializes in its comparative advantage and engages
in trade.54 One of the curious aspects of the theory of comparative
advantage is that trade among nations is mutually beneficial only
so long as capital, labor, or both are constrained across national
borders; it is only the limited mobility of capital and/or labor that
creates benefits from comparative rather than absolute advantage.55
Consequently, when either labor or capital is mobile, the conclusion
that comparative advantage and trade will always and necessarily
inure to the benefit of all countries begins to weaken. Rather, the
only conclusion that can be drawn is that total worldwide efficient
allocation of resources will increase, but not necessarily that all
countries will be better off.56
51. See Christians, supra note 18, at 99; Ring, Sovereignty Debate, supra note 18, at 156-
57.
52. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 10, at 37.
53. Dhammika Dharmapala, What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax
Havens?, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 661 (2008).
54. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International
Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131, 141-42 (2001). 
55. See, e.g., Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of
Free Trade Practice, Global Economics, and Their Governing Principles of Political Economy,
69 UMKC L. REV. 733, 760 (2001) (“Ricardo admitted that comparative advantage works only
when both labor and capital have no substantial mobility.”); Robert E. Prasch, Reassessing
the Theory of Comparative Advantage, 8 REV. POL. ECON. 37, 40-41 (1996). See generally
KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 47, at 10-37. 
56. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83
TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2137 (2005) (“Thus, the critical footnote to the comparative advantage
theory in a world of internationally mobile capital is that nations are not necessarily all better
off under liberalized trade, as is commonly argued. Instead, only the aggregate wealth of
nations is certain to be enhanced, while any particular nation may come out ahead or
behind.”).
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Similarly, tax policy that encourages increased mobility of capital
across borders may well benefit overall worldwide growth by
minimizing distortions to economic decision making, but may not
necessarily benefit all countries, as previously had been assumed.
If this is the case, it is possible for certain countries to be worse off
in a world of mobile capital—notwithstanding overall worldwide
growth.57 As a result, the traditional model has begun to be ques-
tioned on multiple fronts.58 For example, relaxing even one of the
assumptions in the model, such as assuming each country has
independent revenue needs rather than assuming countries try to
maximize worldwide revenue growth, can radically change the
analysis of a Pareto-optimal system, even leading to directly
contrary conclusions.59
Even more radically, a recent strand of literature has concluded
that it is possible, in a world with disparate wealth allocations and
corresponding disparate returns to capital, that the existence of poor
countries with zero tax rates can actually be welfare maximizing,
the exact opposite of the traditional model.60 To the extent that
merely changing one of the assumptions regarding relative prefer-
ences of countries or relative starting points in wealth can have
such profound impacts on the theoretical conclusions arising from
these models, the policies derived from the traditional theory of
minimizing double taxation to maximize worldwide efficient allo-
cation of resources and punishing tax competition must be reconsid-
ered as well. The remainder of this Article will begin the process of
doing so.
57. See Paul Krugman, International Finance and Economic Development, in FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE 11, 18 (Alberto Giovannini ed., 1993) (“It is even
possible to make straightforward arguments suggesting that international financial
integration will promote greater inequality rather than greater convergence in per capita
income.”).
58. See Michael Keen & David Wildasin, Pareto-Efficient International Taxation, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 259, 259 (2004).
59. Changing only this one assumption can result in a source-based tax system with full
offsetting credits serving as indirect fiscal transfers, which would be Pareto-superior to
residence taxation—the exact opposite of the traditional approach. Id. at 269. But see Jeremy
Edwards, Gains from Trade in Government Revenue and Pareto-Efficient International
Taxation, 5 TOPICS ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1 (2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1385&amp;context=bejeap.
60. See, e.g., Baldwin & Krugman, supra note 29, at 21; Krogstrup, supra note 29, at 555-
57. 
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II. DOUBLE TAXATION RELIEF AND TAX COMPETITION: THE TWO
PARADOXES
Before analyzing prescriptive solutions to the problems of the
modern international tax regime, it is necessary to contemplate why
such a state has arisen in the first place. No cabal among states, or
other explicit conspiracy, has been alleged, nor does one seem likely.
Rather, this Article will contend that the phenomena of tax com-
petition and tax havens can be attributed, at least in part, to two
distinct, but related, implicit sources: the capital neutrality and
punishment paradoxes. The capital neutrality paradox provides that
as barriers to capital crossing borders are reduced, the ability to
attract capital through tax competition increases, thereby creating
or exacerbating divergent interests over the taxation of mobile
capital between marginally capital-attractive jurisdictions and
marginally capital-unattractive jurisdictions.61 The punishment
paradox, meanwhile, provides that punishing countries which
engage in tax competition as a result of the incentives of the capital
neutrality paradox will necessarily be counterproductive.
This  combined effect can be thought of either as a function of the
law of unintended consequences or as a natural outgrowth of
existing power dynamics; regardless, taken alone this result may
not change any traditional international tax analysis. Once an addi-
61. This Article will use the generic terms “marginally capital attractive countries” and
“poorer countries” interchangeably rather than a more specific term for two reasons: first, it
is sufficient to describe the theory of the capital neutrality paradox and thus additional
specificity might only distract from the discussion, and second the political economy literature
is divided as to what precisely attracts capital to certain tax havens over others, whether it
be political stability, infrastructure, population, or other resources. See, e.g., Sam Bucovetsky
& John Douglas Wilson, Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments, 21 REGIONAL SCI. URB.
ECON. 333, 335 (1991); Dharmapala & Hines, supra note 17, at 1058. Further, it is unclear
in the literature whether capital endowments or production capability dominate in tax
competition analysis. See supra note 45. For these purposes, it is irrelevant whether the
return at issue is the real risk-adjusted return to capital, the nominal return to capital, or the
endowment- or production-based return to capital. So long as any of them results in a country
or countries having differing marginal returns on capital, the capital neutrality paradox holds.
See Krugman, supra note 57, at 13 (“In fact, most economists looking at the realities of trade
and factor prices have concluded that poorer countries simply have worse production
functions, and hence that the marginal product of capital is not in fact as high as their low
capital-labour ratios would suggest.”).
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tional factor is added, however—that tax laws are used primarily to
raise revenue—the analysis changes, and perhaps dramatically.
More specifically, once it is assumed that tax laws are intended to
raise revenue, it is also reasonable to assume that countries which
adopt a tax system have some minimal amount of revenue that
must be raised; if not, the country would not enact a tax system.
Adding this “minimal revenue need” assumption to the traditional
model can lead to some unexpected conclusions: first, under the
capital neutrality paradox, that tax laws themselves can potentially
create incentives toward tax competition, and second, under the
punishment paradox, punishing tax competition can potentially
hurt the overall international tax regime rather than help. 
This is precisely where the role of law becomes relevant; if the
laws of a particular country, such as the United States, shape the
interactions of countries within the international tax regime in this
manner, the responses to such competition would necessarily
change as well. It therefore becomes necessary to focus on the role
of law in shaping the existing international tax regime before
reaching any theoretical conclusions as to the most efficient
cooperative solution.62
A. The Capital Neutrality Paradox
As discussed above, neutrality as to capital in the form of double
taxation relief and punishing tax competition has formed the
baseline of most modern international tax laws, although there is no
consensus on which specific type of double taxation relief is most
appropriate.63 What has been missing from this debate, however, is
the realization that it is irrelevant which form of double taxation
relief a country adopts, at least looking solely from the perspective
62. This approach is not new to the legal literature, although it does appear novel as
applied to tax competition. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1737, 1738 (2002); Robert Cooter, Commentary, Can Lawyers Say Anything About Economic
Growth? Comment on Frank Cross’s Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1777, 1778
(2002); see also Joyce Palomar, Contributions Legal Scholars Can Make to Development
Economics: Examples from China, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2004) (“Development
experts and legislators need more than broad economic theory, however.... The next steps in
this effort require legal analysts.”).
63. See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 40, at 1108-09.
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of the costs and benefits of tax competition.64 Rather, any move
toward reducing the cost of cross-border capital investment can lead
to the creation or worsening of the incentives to engage in tax
competition. In other words, as the tax laws increasingly focus on
neutrality toward capital, capital becomes more mobile across
borders, making it cheaper and easier for other countries to use
their tax laws to attract capital. This is the heart of the capital
neutrality paradox: one country’s pursuit of neutrality can actually
increase the incentives toward competition for other countries,
potentially undermining the benefits sought by pursuing neutrality
in the first place, or, even worse, resulting in an even less efficient
allocation of resources than if nothing had been done.
To this end, assume a no-tax world with three countries, A, B, and
C, no transaction costs, and full information. Country A provides
the highest return on capital, and Country B is marginally more
attractive for capital investment than Country C. In a world absent
taxes and transaction costs, capital investment would first maxi-
mize return in Country A, then seek investments in Country B until
the combined marginal return on those investments in Country A
and B intersected with those in Country C, in which case investors
would be indifferent. Since capital would flow to its most efficient
uses in all circumstances, the worldwide economy would be Pareto-
efficient.
This can be demonstrated with a simplified numerical example.65
Assume that at time zero Country A would provide a return to
capital of 10 percent, Country B would provide a return to capital of
8 percent, and Country C would provide a return to capital of 7
64. The two leading candidates, “capital export neutrality” (CEN) and “capital import
neutrality” (CIN) focus on different forms of neutrality toward capital: CEN focuses on
imposing uniform taxation of capital regardless of location of investment, while CIN focuses
on equalizing taxation of capital among local competitors. Among the alternatives to these
dominant theories include “national neutrality” attributed to Peggy Musgrave and “ownership
neutrality” attributed to Mihir Desai and James Hines. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & James R.
Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003); Michael J.
Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 556 (2003);
Mitchell A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortions, and International Tax
Welfare Benchmarks, 26 VA. TAX REV. 53, 54-55 & nn.1-2 (2006). 
65. The example is simplified because the effect of investment on returns would not be
binary but rather continuous, and the division would not be equal. Regardless, the intuition
demonstrated by the example holds when broadened to a more dynamic and robust
formulation.
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percent. The first $1,000,000 of capital would be invested in Country
A for the highest return on capital, which reduces the return to 8
percent. At that point, the next $1,000,000 of capital is split between
Countries A and B until the return to capital in both countries is
reduced to 7 percent, that is, the return in Country C. Only at that
time would any capital be invested in Country C, as its marginal
return to capital would no longer be lower than those of Countries
A and B. In the first stage, however, there would be no capital left
to be invested in Country C at this point as it had already been fully
invested in Countries A and B. Under these simplistic assumptions,
the worldwide return on the $2,000,000 of capital is equal to the
$100,000 earned in Country A from the first $1,000,000 investment,
plus the $80,000 earned in Countries A and B from the second
$1,000,000 investment, for a total of $180,000.
The distribution of the benefits would be unequal, however, since
Country C would receive the fewest benefits from capital invest-
ment. Under these numbers, Country A would have generated
$140,000 in capital return and Country B would have generated
$40,000 in capital return, while Country C would have zero capital
return. In the next investment cycle, however, capital would begin
flowing to Country C because the marginal returns to capital of
Country A and B would have dropped to 7 percent as well. Thus,
only by maximizing the total efficiency of worldwide capital would
there be sufficient total capital available for Country C to receive
any capital investment.
Contrast this result to one in which some capital, for example,
$100,000, was forced to be invested in Country C at the beginning
of the process. The return on that $100,000 would be $7,000 instead
of $10,000 if it had been invested in Country A, and thus the world
as a whole would be poorer by $3,000.66 In other words, maximizing
worldwide capital efficiency could be Pareto-optimal notwith-
standing distributional concerns because any attempt to offset this
distributional inequity could result in deadweight loss exceeding
any distributional gains.
66. Calculating the real economic loss would be much more complicated, but this example
is sufficient solely for illustrative purposes. Regardless, the intuition remains the same even
in a more precise calculation.
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Once taxes are introduced, however, this narrative begins to
break down, precisely because the role of the tax law is to raise
revenue. Thus, assume that Countries A, B, and C each impose a
tax rate of 20 percent on capital. If more than one country imposed
tax on capital invested across borders, double taxation would result
and capital would inefficiently avoid such investments. The simplest
and most straightforward way to offset this double taxation would
be for each country to simply exempt earnings in other countries
from tax. In such a case, assuming the same worldwide distribution
of capital, Country A would collect $28,000 in tax revenue, Country
B would collect $8,000 in tax revenue, and Country C would collect
zero tax revenue. Even though the three would collect very different
amounts of revenue, the theory goes, all should agree to such an
arrangement in the interest of maximizing the long-term growth of
all three economies.
This is not necessarily the case, however, once two crucial, and
likely more realistic, assumptions are introduced: (1) that each
country has a minimum revenue need,67 and (2) that direct interna-
tional fiscal transfers are limited or impossible.68 These two assump-
tions effectively undercut the conclusion that maximizing worldwide
efficiency will always and necessarily inure to the benefit of all
countries involved. Rather, each country must first ensure that it
meets its own minimum revenue needs first, and only then attempt
to maximize overall worldwide growth.
This approach effectively undermines the traditional approach
to international taxation to first maximize worldwide growth and
then redistribute tax revenue solely as a matter of fairness or
distributive justice.69 If, however, the minimum revenue need itself
67. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 16, at 1634-35. This Article uses minimum
revenue needs as the determining factor, but a similar result holds if the poorer country
prefers capital investment more than worldwide growth, such as if tax revenue has a declining
marginal utility or if capital accumulation is a valuable end in itself. See KATHARINA
HOLZINGER, TRANSNATIONAL COMMON GOODS: STRATEGIC CONSTELLATIONS, COLLECTIVE
ACTION PROBLEMS, AND MULTI-LEVEL PROVISION 93-99 (2008) (finding similar results when
using political benefits from attracting capital rather than minimum revenue needs).
68. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 16, at 1649 (“Explicit redistribution among
countries is rare, especially given widespread dissatisfaction with foreign aid.”); Keen &
Wildasin, supra note 58, at 260.
69. See id. (“It is widely accepted that redistributive income taxation can be justified by
considerations of vertical equity and the declining marginal utility of income. But there
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is influencing the incentives to tax competition, then it must be
included in the economic efficiency step of the analysis, rather than
thought of as a second and unrelated “fairness” step.70 The remain-
der of this Article will therefore treat minimum revenue needs as
part of the incentive structure of the international tax regime rather
than as an exogenous policy issue.
Under this framework, Country A as the first mover has to take
into account multiple considerations: first, it must ensure that it can
raise its minimum revenue; second, it will want to maximize
worldwide economic efficiency; and third, it will want to prevent
other countries from engaging in tax competition so as to reduce its
tax base. Under these conditions, there is no one policy that Country
A can adopt as a matter of international tax law so as to both
maximize capital neutrality and achieve the ideal distribution of tax
revenues because any move toward capital neutrality by Country A
will reinforce existing capital disparities as among Country B and
Country C. In other words, assuming preexisting capital disparities
means that capital neutrality will always disproportionately benefit
some at the expense of others.
Without considering revenue needs, this reality is no different
than a world absent taxes, that is, there are rich countries and poor
countries. If Country C has a sufficient domestic tax base, and that
tax base is sufficiently inelastic, then the focus on capital neutrality
by Country A may not adversely impact Country C.71 Assuming
Country C does not have a sufficient domestic tax base, or that such
base is sufficiently elastic, however, to raise its minimum revenue,
the only recourse would be to try to attract tax revenue away from
Country A or Country B. Thus, Country C would be forced to use its
tax system, not to pursue capital neutrality, but rather to pursue
tax revenue from the international tax base.
appears to be no sound theoretical reason to restrict redistribution to members of any single
tax jurisdiction. If there were a world taxing authority, it would be justified in redistributing
wealth on a worldwide basis.”) (footnote omitted).
70. See Leibrecht & Rixen, supra note 19, at 62 (“[I]ndependent jurisdictions interact
strategically in setting taxes.”).
71. This is a crucial assumption in the literature regarding tax competition, that is, that
countries can realistically only tax economic rents and no other returns located in their
jurisdiction, absent cooperation among states to prevent tax competition. See id. at 1642.
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What may perhaps surprise some is that, under neoclassical
economic theory, this should never be the case because Country A
would represent the poorest country while Country C would
represent the wealthiest.72 In such case, neither Country A nor
Country C should have any problem meeting minimal revenue
needs, as Country C is wealthy already and Country A attracts the
most capital through economic returns. Under this theory, some-
times referred to as convergence, as the supply of capital in a
particular country increases, the returns on capital decrease as
compared to those in countries with a lower supply of capital,73
while countries with lower supplies of capital will have higher
demand for capital, leading to higher returns.74 The result would be
poorer countries paying a higher return on capital than wealthier
countries, meaning capital should generally flow from high capital
countries to low capital countries.75 Correspondingly, all countries
should have an incentive to adopt some form of double taxation
relief; wealthy countries would be better off since their domestic
capital would achieve higher returns abroad, while poorer countries
would be better off by increasing the amount of capital flowing to
them.
The problem with this analysis is that it ignores the empirical
reality identified in the literature that capital in fact does not flow
to poorer countries as predicted under the neoclassical model.76
Rather, either capital flows less to such countries than would be
72. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 47, at 672.
73. Id. at 667.
74. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Poor Countries Poor?: The Role of
Institutional Capital in Economic Development, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT
15, 16 (Edgardo Buscaglia, William Ratliff & Robert Cooter eds., 1997).
75. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 47, at 672; see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH,
INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 6 (1990) (“[S]tandard
neoclassical and international trade theory ... implies that over time economies, as they
traded goods, services, and productive factors, would gradually converge.”).
76. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note
47, at 671-72; NORTH, supra note 75, at 6-7. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the
context of bilateral investment treaties, although the evidence is not necessarily as clear. See,
e.g., Deborah L. Swenson, Why Do Developing Countries Sign BITS?, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 131 (2005); Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible
Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct
Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805 (2008).
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expected under the model77 or actually flows in the opposite direc-
tion.78 Consequently, in the example Country A would be the
wealthiest country while Country C would be the poorest. Under
these circumstances, Country C would likely be unable to meet its
minimum revenue needs solely out of its domestic tax base since it
could not attract capital through economic returns alone and is
capital-poor to start with.
Taken alone, this may be troubling from a distributional stand-
point, since poor countries could become locked in a cycle of poverty
without access to capital.79 Once the law of international tax is
introduced, however, the analysis becomes particularly troubling
—precisely because the role of the tax law is to raise revenue for
public goods or redistribution. Thus, the issue no longer centers on
fairness, development, or distributional issues, but instead on the
incentives created by the tax laws on the behavior of countries, and
in particular whether poorer countries have an incentive to engage
in tax competition because they are otherwise unable to raise
sufficient revenue to meet their minimum revenue needs.80
77. See Lucas, supra note 28, at 92.
78. Presumably in part because these findings so directly contradict neoclassical economic
theory, it was not until 1990 that it was established that this was the case. In an influential
paper, Robert Lucas demonstrated that significantly less capital flowed to India in the
twentieth century than should have under any classical economic model. See id. at 92. This
finding was so dramatic, in particular because it could not be explained by legal differences
since India was at the time a British colony, that it earned the moniker of the “Lucas
Paradox”—that is, an empirical finding that could not be explained under any existing
economic model. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The Lucas Paradox led to further
explorations of capital flows over different periods of time, which consistently confirmed the
Lucas Paradox. For example, it has been demonstrated empirically that substantially less
capital flowed to poorer countries during the period of British hegemony than would be
expected, see Clemens & Williamson, supra note 28, at 1, and that significantly less capital
has flowed to Africa in recent years than would be expected, see MONTIEL, supra note 27, at
1-2; Alfaro et al., supra note 28; Cohen & Soto, supra note 28, at 1-2. That this finding is
robust across periods of time and across jurisdictional boundaries necessitates, at a minimum,
taking such findings seriously in crafting tax policy. See Gourinchas & Jeanne, supra note 28.
79. See Cohen & Soto, supra note 28.
80. This has begun to be reflected in a recent strand of economics literature, sometimes
referred to as “new economic geography.” See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Role of Geography in
Development, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 89, 90
(Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1998); Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, The Structure of
Simple ‘New Economic Geography’ Models, 5 J. ECON. GEOG. 201 (2005). This literature
focuses not on where capital should flow theoretically, but rather builds on the premise that
a “core” of wealthy countries and a “periphery” of poorer countries exists or arises under
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The paradox arises precisely because smaller countries can use
their tax laws to attract capital by exploiting policies adopted by
wealthier countries to mitigate double taxation in the first place.81
In other words, if Country A and Country C both imposed a tax on
a single item of income such that there was double taxation, there
would be no amount of tax competition Country C could engage in
to attract the capital. Even if Country C offered a zero tax rate, the
capital would have no incentive to leave Country A since it would
pay the full Country A tax regardless of where it was located. The
only thing that makes tax competition a useful instrument for
Country C is the ability to exploit the anti-double-taxation regimes
of Country A.82
Returning to the example, assume Country A has a minimum
revenue need of $25,000 and knows that a world with perfect capital
neutrality would result in capital earnings of $140,000. As a result,
Country A adopts a 20 percent tax rate solely on its domestic tax
base to raise $28,000 in tax revenue. Under this approach, Country
A has a sufficient tax base to both raise its minimum revenue and
maximize worldwide growth (by exempting foreign income). Country
B has a minimum revenue need of $8,000 and thus also adopts a 20
percent tax rate solely on its domestic tax base of $40,000; although
smaller than Country A, County B still has a sufficient tax base to
raise $8,000 in tax revenue and exempt foreign income.
certain assumptions. See, e.g., Baldwin & Krugman, supra note 29, at 6; cf. Yoram Margalioth,
Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments, and Growth: Using the Tax System To Promote
Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 172 (2003). From this approach, what happens is
not a “race to the bottom,” in which all countries lower rates to zero, but rather a split, in
which wealthy countries have a positive tax rate on capital while poorer countries end up with
a zero tax rate on capital. See Rainald Borck & Michael Pflüger, Agglomeration and Tax
Competition, 50 EUR. ECON. REV. 647, 647-48 (2006). Of particular importance to this analysis
is that the lower the barriers to movement of goods and capital, the more likely this bifurcated
outcome becomes. This is precisely the case when capital neutrality forms the focus of
international tax laws, yielding the capital neutrality paradox.
81. See Leibrecht & Rixen, supra note 19, at 66-67.
82. See id. at 63 (“[Double tax avoidance rules] provide an institutional foundation of tax
competition.”). That the form of such exploitation may differ depending on the method of
double tax relief is less relevant than the incentives that poorer countries would have to adopt
laws to further such exploitation. For example, under an exemption model the incentive might
be to relocate capital whereas under a credit model the incentive might be to relocate the
nominal taxpayer. Either way, the poorer country would have an incentive to accommodate
the move through its laws. I am indebted to David Hasen for this insight.
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Country C, however, has no tax base because worldwide capital
is fully invested in Countries A and B.83 Country C does, however,
have a minimum tax revenue need of $1,000. Without attracting a
sufficient tax base at some positive tax rate, Country C would not
be able to raise its minimum revenue. Conceptually Country C could
raise its minimum revenue in one of two ways: (1) it could impose
tax on capital located in Country A or Country B, or (2) it could use
its tax laws to attract capital into its taxing jurisdiction to meet its
minimum revenue needs. For example, it could impose a .6 percent
tax on the $180,000 tax base84 of Country A and Country B in
addition to the 20 percent tax imposed by those countries, resulting
in double taxation, or it could attempt to attract capital away from
Countries A and B by offering higher after-tax returns.
Since capital invested in Country C would not be subject to tax in
Country A or Country B because they each adopted territorial
exemption, Country C reduces its tax rate to 5 percent to attract tax
base. As a result, the second $1,000,000 of capital faces a vastly
different decision based on after-tax returns than before-tax
returns: investments in Country A or Country B would earn 6.4
percent after-tax while investments in Country C would earn 6.65
percent after-tax.85 Assume Country C attracts $290,000 of capital
away from Countries A and B as a result, earning a 7 percent pre-
tax return ($20,300) instead of an 8 percent pre-tax return
($23,200). Although this is clearly inefficient from a worldwide
capital perspective, from Country C’s perspective it is worthwhile
since it is now able to raise $1,015 of tax revenue,86 meeting its
minimum revenue need. Conversely, Countries A and B collectively
lose $4,640 of tax revenue.87 Notwithstanding that this is inferior
from both an overall worldwide revenue and overall worldwide
83. Further, since Countries A and B each independently set their rates at 20 percent to
meet their own revenue needs based on their assumptions as to available tax base, they do
not have much if any revenue to transfer or divide tax revenue with Country C.
84. This would be the level sufficient to meet its minimum revenue needs of $1,000
($180,000 * .6% = $1,080).
85. For Country A and Country B the after-tax returns are equal to (1-20%) * (8%), while
for Country C the after-tax return is equal to (1-5%) * (7%). 
86. $20,300 * 5% = $1,015.
87. $23,300 * 20% = $4,640.
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economic growth perspective, Country C rationally engaged in tax
competition.
This result will always be the case when before-tax and after-tax
returns diverge, under these assumptions. Thus, a perfect solution
would be to always equate the two. For example, assume Countries
A and B adopt a credit for foreign taxes paid upon income subject to
tax in those countries. Theoretically, such an approach would
completely ameliorate both the double taxation and the ability of
Country C to use taxes to attract capital. Returning to the example,
assume an investor is considering whether to invest $290,000 of
capital in Country C. The $20,300 of income generated in Country
C would be taxed at 5 percent in Country C and 20 percent in
Country A or B (less the credit). The taxpayer would pay $1,015 of
tax to Country C and owe $3,625 of tax to Country A or B, for a total
of $4,640. In this manner, the capital has no incentive to move to
Country C since it will pay the Country A or B tax no matter what
and receives a higher before-tax return in either Country A or B.
Thus, under the foreign tax credit approach, Country C could not
use tax competition to attract capital.
The problem with this theoretically perfect solution is the revenue
constraint discussed above.88 As evidenced in the example, to ensure
that taxpayers never pay more than its domestic tax rate a country
would have to refund foreign taxes paid.89 Taken to an extreme, if
a foreign country’s tax rates were greater than those of the home
country, the home country would actually have to refund taxes in
excess of its tax rate, resulting in negative tax revenues. Since the
assumption is that taxes are imposed to raise revenue, this is not a
logically consistent conclusion. As a result, the credit must be
capped in some manner.90
For example, assume Country B imposes a tax rate of 30 percent
rather than 20 percent and Country A adopts an unlimited foreign
tax credit. If $100,000 was subject to tax in Country B and also
subject to tax in Country A, there would be a 50 percent tax absent
88. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, The Grand Illusion: A Neutral System for the Taxation of
International Transactions, 75 VA. L. REV. 919, 927-28 (1989) [hereinafter Roin, The Grand
Illusion].
90. See id. at 928-30.
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relief. Country A permits a credit for Country B taxes, however.
Thus, $30,000 of tax is paid to Country B and Country A imposes a
tax of $20,000 minus credit for the $30,000 paid to Country B. As a
result, Country A must write a check of $10,000 to achieve an
effective 20 percent tax rate, effectively a negative 10 percent rate.
There is nothing theoretically stopping Country B from raising its
rates forever, since Country A would continue to refund excess taxes
in this manner. Of course, the limit is the amount of money Country
A needs to spend on its own public goods, in effect a minimum
revenue constraint. As a result, assume Country A must cap the
credit it will give in some manner—at this point, the possibility for
before-tax and after-tax returns to diverge reemerges, making tax
competition relevant once again to the analysis.
In effect, the capital neutrality paradox provides that increasing
the mobility of capital out of wealthier countries, regardless of
form—with the additional assumptions of minimum revenue need
and limited fiscal transfers—creates the possibility of rational
incentives for certain countries to compete over capital through
taxes. This conclusion runs directly counter to most of the incentive-
based analyses of tax havens in the legal literature, which assume
a “race to the bottom” model that can be resolved through common
interests in cooperation.91 The capital neutrality paradox reverses
this conclusion by focusing on the pursuit of neutrality-derived
principles by wealthy countries as causing or exacerbating the
incentives of poor countries to engage in tax competition. In such a
case, no amount of coordination among countries, or assurances of
cooperation with other countries, would necessarily slow tax
competition.92 Even worse, it would imply that the greater coopera-
tion among wealthier countries, the greater the incentive would be
to compete on the part of poorer countries. Put differently, the risk
to a tax haven is not that other poor countries would undercut them
if they cooperated with wealthy countries, but that competition is
91. See Julie A. Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 552-54 (2001); cf. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 16, at
1643. 
92. Cf. HOLZINGER, supra note 67, at 98-99.
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necessary to raise minimal amounts of tax revenue in the face of a
wealthy country cartel.93
Perhaps one reason the capital neutrality paradox, based on
minimum revenue assumptions, has not been identified in the past
is because many tax haven countries adopt income tax rates of zero
or near-zero—either explicitly through rates or through granting tax
holidays—and thus the assumption has been that such jurisdictions
raise little to no revenue through tax competition.94 Instead, it has
been argued for the most part that tax competition is used to attract
business investment for the benefit of local economies, such as
increasing business for local lawyers, accountants, bankers, and
other financial service industries.95 Such an assumption would miss
several potential means of raising revenue with respect to such
capital, however, including through a small income or wage tax on
incremental local salaries, consumption taxes on incremental
foreign consumption within the tax haven such as meals, lodging,
and similar activity, or most likely, excise-type taxes on the
privilege of exploiting tax competition, such as franchise taxes on
the formation or operation of legal entities.96 These latter forms of
revenue could be of particular benefit to a country selling income tax
benefits to foreign investors because they directly charge the
consumers for such benefits. Although these sources of revenue
would tend to be miniscule compared to the worldwide loss of
income tax revenue resulting from the tax competition, they could
93. Cf. Diane M. Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty, and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax
Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555, 582 (2009) (discussing the
effects of the OECD tax competition project on tax havens); see also Alexander Townsend, Jr.,
Comment, The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development’s Coercive Efforts To Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 215, 251-
58 (2001) (same).
94. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 10, at 21.
95. Id.; see also supra note 20.
96. See, e.g., Randall Jackson, U.K. Pushes Cayman Islands To Introduce New Taxes, 2009
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 169-1 (Sept. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Jackson, Cayman Islands]
(“Companies registered in the islands are charged no direct taxes at all. George Town
therefore relies on indirect income sources such as customs duties, stamp duties, and
transaction fees such as those charged on property sales, mortgages, land leases, rents, and
business licenses based on the number of employees, according to media reports. The business
licenses, one of the prime income sources, can reportedly cost up to KYD 500,000.”); cf. Ilan
Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Hybrid
Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 619, 643 (2009).
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well be sufficient for the poorest countries in the world to meet their
minimum revenue needs.97 In other words, what might be an
inconsequential amount of tax revenue in the United States could
well be sufficient to fund public goods such as roads and electricity
in a jurisdiction such as the Cayman Islands for a year.98
From this perspective, what is important is both the level of tax
revenue in a given jurisdiction and its sensitivity to taxes, not the
per capita wealth or GDP of a jurisdiction. For example, the
Cayman Islands could be subject to the pressures of the capital
neutrality paradox if its tax base is highly elastic to taxes even
though its current per capita GDP is relatively high.99 In such a
case, when revenues are insufficient to invest in public goods such
as roads and schools and raising taxes is not a realistic option, the
country could be thought to be caught in the capital neutrality
paradox.100
The fact that some countries meet their minimum revenue needs
through tax competition does not mean that every small, poor
country will become a tax haven, or that even if such a country
desired to be a tax haven it could do so. In fact, it is likely that only
the most marginally attractive jurisdictions would be able to
successfully implement tax haven strategies.101 For example, in all
97. Cf. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 46, at 111-13 (discussing how states such as
Delaware where franchise taxes compose a large percentage of total revenue are more likely
to engage in charter competition).
98. See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., Offshore Haven Considers a Heresy: Taxation, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at A1 (“[The leader of the Cayman government] credits the tax-free policy
for transforming the islands. A native of the Caymans, Mr. Bush recalls growing up in poverty
.... ‘There were no cars, no electricity—there will be no going back to living under the coconut
tree,’ he said .... ‘The people have prospered—this country was built on this model.’”).
99. See Leibrecht & Rixen, supra note 19, at 62 (noting that tax base must be sensitive
to tax rate as a condition for tax competition to arise); see also Miller, supra note 35, at 6.
100. See Randall Jackson, U.K. Overseas Territory Tax Havens Face Financial Strain, 2009
WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 176-4 (Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Jackson, Financial Strain]; Mason,
supra note 11 (“The Cayman Islands has so far resisted the idea of direct taxation of its
residents and companies, arguing that this would jeopardise its livelihood as one of the
world's biggest financial centres with the 12th richest GDP per head.”). A similar phenomenon
has also been seen in relatively “wealthy” countries such as Ireland. See, e.g., Ross Douthat,
Ireland’s Paradise Lost, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2010, at A23; Quentin Fottrell, Ireland Cuts
Budget in Bid To Tame Debt, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2009, at A19; Martin A. Sullivan, Can
Hard-Pressed Ireland Keep Its Low Corporate Rate?, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 196-94 (Oct. 12,
2010). 
101. See Dharmapala & Hines, supra note 17, at 1060-61.
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likelihood—even if they offered identical tax benefits—based solely
on geography, South Pacific countries, such as the Cook Islands,
would be unlikely to attract as many investors based in Connecticut
as Caribbean countries such as the Cayman Islands. Likewise,
Ireland may be more attractive as an entrée to Europe than non-EU
members such as Belize, while Switzerland may well be more
attractive as a source of bank secrecy than Vanuatu. Notwithstand-
ing that each country might have an incentive to engage in tax
competition due to the capital neutrality paradox, some will
necessarily be more successful than others at doing so; this by itself
does not mean the incentives toward competition are not present.102
Similarly, other nontax factors may outweigh incentives to tax
competition, such as gains from trade in the case of China and the
United States; again, this does not mean such incentives are not
present, but only that they are not determinative. Accordingly, the
conclusion can be reached that one of the incentives driving
countries toward tax competition, and for some states perhaps the
defining one, arises due to the choices and policies embedded in the
international tax rules of wealthier countries such as the United
States.
B. The Punishment Paradox
The primary lesson to be learned from the capital neutrality
paradox is that to fully analyze the impact of a particular interna-
tional tax law it must be thought of not only with respect to the
distortion of taxpayer behavior due to changed costs, but also on the
incentives created for other countries.103 Consequently, when tax
competition is perceived in a system, two alternatives need to be
considered: (1) to identify the incentives leading to the competition
and overcome them by increasing the cost of noncooperation through
the use of law (the “punishment theory”), or (2) to identify the
incentives leading to the competition and then amend the underly-
102. In fact, there is evidence that countries compete over the type of tax competition
offered, leading to specialized tax havens. See Leibrecht & Rixen, supra note 19, at 70 (“[T]ax
havens actively search for market niches and try to specialize in different tax planning
activities.”).
103. See Allison Christians, Steven Dean, Diane M. Ring & Adam H. Rosenzweig, Taxation
as a Global Socio-Legal Phenomenon, 14 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 303, 313-14 (2008).
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ing international tax laws so as to ameliorate the incentives for
noncooperation.104 The punishment theory has dominated the inter-
national tax laws and the international tax literature to date, but
the second may be more appropriate, especially given the capital
neutrality paradox.
For purposes of this discussion, it may be useful to more clearly
define punishment in these contexts. Punishment is intended to
reduce the incentives to countries to become tax havens—that is,
engage in harmful tax competition—by reducing the yields to such
behavior. Thus, assuming tax havens use low taxes to provide
higher after-tax yields as a way to attract capital, imposing a tax
penalty on any capital invested in such countries —that is, reducing
the after-tax yield for investment in such countries—would be an
effective punishment to offset the tax competition.105 
Assuming arguendo that tax havens engage in competitive
behavior due to the capital neutrality paradox, observing that
countries engage in tax haven activity necessarily establishes that
the current international tax regime creates incentives for them to
do so. In such a case, punishing a taxpayer for investing in a tax
haven as a means of encouraging cooperation would only exacerbate
the overall effect of the paradox by increasing the after-tax cost of
capital for investments made in the haven country;106 as the after-
tax returns for taxpayers decreased due to the punishment, the
104. A third option, preventing the mobility of capital, is not discussed in this Article since
it is both not a realistic description of the modern world and presumably the efficiency losses
of significant restrictions on capital mobility would vastly outweigh any anti-tax-competition
benefits. See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Do Strong Fences Make Strong
Neighbors? (June 2010) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1651620); see also supra note 44. But see Johannes Becker & Marco Runkel, Even Small
Trade Costs Restore Efficiency in Tax Competition (CESifo, Working Paper No. 3221, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1697991.
105. Punishment of private capital investing in tax havens is the primary form of
punishment that will be considered in this Article. A second type of punishment, in the form
of shaming or blacklisting the haven itself, has also been adopted. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION, supra note 10, at 61. To the extent this type of punishment is also intended to
reduce the return on capital in such countries by increasing uncertainty or increasing social
norm punishment for investing in such countries, it in effect serves the same purpose and
thus can be thought of in the same manner for purposes of this Article.
106. See Robert T. Kudrle, Did Blacklisting Hurt the Tax Havens? 16-17 (Paolo Baffi Ctr.
Research Paper Series, No. 2008-23, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1243695
(finding mixed results from the effects of OECD anti-tax-haven initiatives).
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demand for more tax incentives to return to the previous after-tax
returns would grow.107 Thought of another way, punishing tax
havens could be considered as a form of transfer of capital, and thus
tax revenue, from the tax haven back to the punishing country,
thereby increasing the incentive for the tax haven to compete over
that capital even more aggressively.108
The resulting incentives from such punishment, that mobile
capital will increasingly seek out new forms of tax benefits and
certain countries will increasingly need to raise revenue, could
rationally lead a particular country to engage in even higher levels
of tax competition to retain the same after-tax return on capi-
tal—and thus tax base—as before the punishment was enacted.
Perversely, they might even have to engage in even greater tax
competition, since they would need to attract even more tax base
than before as a result of needing to adopt lower effective tax rates
in response to the punishment. In other words, attempts to “punish”
domestic taxpayers with activities in tax havens would increase the
pressure on such taxpayers to demand greater tax benefits from
abroad, correspondingly increasing the incentives for tax havens to
provide them.109 This effect continues so long as there remain
available additional (and more costly) instruments to engage in tax
competition and countries willing to use them to attract capital
base.
107. See Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., The Demand for Tax Haven
Operations, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 513, 520-23 (2006). The increase in demand occurs precisely
because the penalty is not universal, in which case it would not change the relative cost of
capital across borders. Cf. Michael S. Knoll, International Competitiveness, Tax Incentives,
and a New Argument for Tax Sparing: Preventing Double Taxation by Crediting Implicit Taxes
29-31 (U. of Penn. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 08-21, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1259927 (discussing this effect in the
context of tax sparing). 
108. See David E. Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a
Corrective Subsidy, 25 J. URB. ECON. 193, 194 (1989).
109. Ironically, the Joint Committee on Taxation implicitly acknowledged as much even
while arguing in support of the punishment theory by conceding that withdrawing from the
Bermuda Insurance Tax treaty would likely have little substantive effect on the total amount
of tax haven shelters. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., PRESENT LAW
AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO SELECTED INTERNATIONAL TAX ISSUES 65 n.188 (Comm. Print
2007) (“Even if terminating the U.S.-Bermuda tax treaty would have little practical effect, its
termination might be viewed as an indication of U.S. tax treaty policy.”).
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The heart of the punishment paradox is that this will always be
the case in a world with the capital neutrality paradox, precisely
because the prescriptions derived from capital neutrality encourage
capital to flow across borders. This is the crucial step in the
punishment paradox, because the economics literature for the most
part tends to assume that countries can only reduce tax rates to
zero.110 The reality, however, is that legal instruments can be
crafted to create negative effective tax rates,111 precisely by exploit-
ing the baseline “neutral” rules in countries such as the United
States.112 Consequently, without punishing every tax instrument
capable of attracting capital—which would be impractical if not
impossible so long as neutrality underlies the baseline rules113
—punishment will not eliminate the incentives in the system for
there to be tax competition; rather, it will merely shift the competi-
tion to other countries, other instruments, or both.
For example, assume a system with four countries, the United
States, Japan, Bermuda, and Uzbekistan. For simplicity, assume
the United States and Japan both adopt exemption systems and
neither Bermuda nor Uzbekistan have sufficient domestic tax
base to raise their minimum revenue needs. As a result, both
Bermuda and Uzbekistan engage in tax competition of some sort to
attract tax base. Due to a number of factors, including geography,
currency, language, and institutions, the market prefers Bermuda
to Uzbekistan for tax haven investments, and thus Bermuda at-
tracts substantial tax base away from the United States and Japan
while Uzbekistan attracts little, but positive, tax base away from
them. Subsequently, Japan and the United States jointly punish
Bermuda by imposing a penalty on taxpayers who invest in
Bermuda, reducing the after-tax marginal return on capital in
Bermuda. The intended effect is to keep tax base in the United
110. Baldwin & Krugman, supra note 29, at 12-13. 
111. See Fleming et al., supra note 33, at 140-42. 
112. For example, as discussed in more detail infra Part III, such exploitation may be
effected through methods such as transfer pricing, loss allocation rules, or income blending
rules. See Fleming et al., supra note 33, at 118, 131, 140-42. There is no perfect solution for
any one of these problems, such as replacing transfer pricing with formulary apportionment,
let alone for all of them. Id. at 128 (“Formulary apportionment is not a panacea.”).
113. Further, there is no reason to believe that equalizing the worldwide after-tax marginal
returns on capital in this manner would itself be an optimal solution. See Knoll, supra note
107, at 33-34.
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States and Japan. Concurrently, such an approach brings the risk-
adjusted marginal return on capital in Bermuda closer to that of
Uzbekistan, making Uzbekistan a more attractive tax haven
destination for taxpayers.
In effect, by punishing taxpayers for investing in a tax haven, the
law could serve mainly to transfer tax base from one tax haven to
another, rather than to mitigate the tax haven problem for the
system as a whole.114 This effect would continue for as long as
countries had different marginal returns on capital and minimum
revenue needs. Returning to the example, assume the United States
has the highest marginal return on capital and Japan has the
second highest. Even if Japan and the United States were to impose
significant penalties on both Bermuda and Uzbekistan, this would
only make the marginal after-tax return on capital in Bermuda and
Uzbekistan approach that of Japan. At some point, Japan would
have an incentive to use its own tax laws to attract tax base away
from the United States, or perhaps more realistically, to maintain
its own domestic tax base.
If it is unrealistic to imagine Japan becoming a tax haven, apply
a similar analysis to a world with over one hundred countries, with
the progression moving from Bermuda, Jersey, and Mauritius in the
lowest tier, to Liechtenstein and Morocco in the next tier, and
Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands in the third tier. As nations
punished Bermuda, Jersey, and Mauritius, the incentive would shift
to Liechtenstein and Morocco, and if nations then punished them
the incentive would shift to Austria, Ireland, and the Nether-
lands.115 There is no reason to think this is unrealistic—after all, in
the real world the title of tax haven has, over the years, passed
down from countries such as Canada and Luxembourg to Switzer-
land and then to the Cayman Islands.116
114. See Wildasin, supra note 108, at 194.
115. Although Austria, for example, is a much wealthier country than Mauritius, Austria,
in addition to Luxembourg and Belgium, was recently accused of engaging in certain types
of tax haven behavior. See Charles Gnaedinger, Luxembourg, Other Tax Havens React to
OECD Gray List, 2009 WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY 64-4 (Apr. 6, 2009). Similarly, after “anti-
inversion” legislation was enacted in the United States, taxpayers shifted activities from
“island havens” to countries such as Ireland and Switzerland. See Lee A. Sheppard, News
Analysis: Taking the Good With the Bad in the Anti-Inversion Rule, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY
31-2 (Feb. 16, 2010).
116. See supra note 11.
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Even worse, the punishment paradox could potentially result in
countries institutionalizing tax competition, making it substantially
more difficult, if not impossible, to reverse. This would be the case
when a country was only able to raise an amount of tax revenue
exactly at or just slightly above its minimum revenue need through
tax competition. Since the country used tax competition to attract
tax base, it is safe to assume the tax base would be highly elastic
to tax rates. Thus, any attempt to raise tax rates in any meaning-
ful manner would lose net revenue by causing tax base to flee.
Assuming a country on the margin of its minimum revenue need
could not afford to lose revenue in this manner, it would therefore
be unable to raise rates.
Under this theory, such countries could be thought of as caught
in an inefficient cycle. First, to attract capital, and tax base, they
must engage in tax competition, but once they engage in tax
competition they do not have any additional source of revenue to
build the institutions required to attract fresh capital, making tax
competition even more necessary, leading to even further inefficient
institutions.117 Accordingly, it is possible that once countries become
tax havens they can effectively be trapped, unable to raise sufficient
revenue to spend on development beyond their minimum revenue
needs.118 If this is correct, punishment could be thought of as
impaling tax havens on a Morton’s Fork:119 if they increase domestic
117. See Mancur Olson, Jr., Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich,
and Others Poor, in DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
GLOBAL INEQUALITY 381, 401-03 (Mitchell A. Seligson & John T. Passé-Smith eds., 2003).
Further, even if they wanted to, such countries might not have the institutions necessary to
undertake the structural reforms to lead to growth. See Dean, supra note 18, at 926-28
(describing how tax havens do not have the institutions to administer a modern income tax).
118. See Joshua Aizenman & Yothin Jinjarak, Globalisation and Developing Countries—A
Shrinking Tax Base?, 45 J. DEV. STUD. 653, 668 (2009) (finding that globalization forces
developing countries to move from easy-to-collect to hard-to-collect taxes, leading to a reduced
tax base); Roy W. Bahl & Richard M. Bird, Tax Policy in Developing Countries: Looking
Back—And Forward, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 279, 289-90 (2008); Jackson, Cayman Islands, supra
note 96.
119. A Morton’s Fork is a practical dilemma in which both choices offered are equally
unattractive, as opposed to a Hobson’s Choice in which there are nominally two options but
in reality only one. See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1106 (2d ed. 1989). For examples of
a Morton’s Fork, see McCullen v. Coakley, 571 F.3d 167, 182 (1st Cir. 2009), and Burroughs
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 623 n.13 (2d Cir. 1982). For a discussion of these
issues more generally, see Allison Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy
in the Least Developed Countries, 42 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 239 (2009). 
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taxes to raise revenue, they lose the tax base they attracted with tax
competition in the first place, while if they do not they cannot raise
additional revenue to invest in those public goods necessary to spur
development beyond their minimum revenue needs.120 Absent
relieving the pressure to rely on such institutions by providing
other ways to access capital, such countries may effectively be
incapable of ceasing to act as tax havens even in the face of
increasing punishment.
Lastly, although beyond the scope of this analysis, the punish-
ment theory could potentially raise some troubling normative
concerns as well. For example, at least one article has argued that
“restricting developing countries’ ability to compete for foreign
investment by offering tax incentives does not truly restrict the
countries’ autonomy or run counter to their interests”121 because
cooperation is in the interest of all countries. If, however, the legal
regime of the United States itself creates or exacerbates the
incentives for certain countries to become tax havens, to then have
wealthier countries punish them for following the incentives created
by the wealthier countries themselves could be precisely the type of
imposition on sovereignty and autonomy identified as normatively
troubling in the literature.122 
C. The International Tax Paradoxes Operationalized
The story that poorer countries might have an incentive to use
their tax laws to attract capital investment is not new, nor is the
story that United States taxpayers would have an incentive to seek
120. See, e.g., Alice Sindzingre, Financing the Developmental State: Tax and Revenue
Issues, 25 DEV. POL’Y REV. 615, 622-27 (2007) (finding sub-Saharan African countries are
constrained from using tax policy for development due to dependence on commodities, the
effects of trade liberalization, and the impact of aid); Jackson, Financial Strain, supra note
100; cf. NORTH, supra note 75, at 9 (“The organizations that develop in this institutional
framework will become more efficient—but more efficient at making ... the basic institutional
structure even less conducive to productive activity.”).
121. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 16, at 1646; see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION 5 (2000).
122. See, e.g., Christians, supra note 18, at 144-48. A detailed examination of this issue
within the context of an incentives-based analysis would be necessary to craft prescriptive
solutions, but is beyond the scope of this Article.
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out low-tax jurisdictions to minimize their taxes.123 The novelty of
the capital neutrality paradox and the punishment paradox is the
insight that these previously presumptively unrelated legal prob-
lems can really be thought of as legal manifestations of the larger
underlying issues of disparate incentives as between wealthier and
poorer countries in the international tax regime.124 In other words,
by choosing a baseline of capital neutrality, the law creates a form
of tax competition that cannot be punished. As a result, punishing
more blatant forms of tax competition simply shifts tax competition
into this potentially more harmful form. The following discussion
will describe some familiar shortcomings of different neutrality-
based regimes and explain how they can more accurately be thought
of as symptoms of these larger, unifying paradoxes.
1. Territorial Exemption and Tax Competition
Although not the primary policy behind U.S. tax law, partial or
complete territorial exemption has served as the basis for the
international tax laws of many of the worlds developed countries.125
To pursue this policy, a country would impose a territorial tax, or a
tax only on income generated within the territory of the juris-
diction.126 By so doing, income earned outside the jurisdiction would
be exempt from the income tax of that jurisdiction, but subject to the
income tax of the source jurisdiction.127 For example, assuming
Germany has a purely territorial regime, income earned by BMW
from sales of cars in Germany would be subject to German income
123. See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in
International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV.
299, 342-44 (2001); Robert J. Peroni, Deferral of U.S. Tax on International Income: End It,
Don’t Mend It—Why Should We Be Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1609,
1613-14 (2001) [hereinafter Peroni, Stuck in the Middle].
124. Cf. Miller supra note 35 (cataloguing myriad provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
which can provide an incentive to domestic capital to invest offshore).
125. See, e.g., Ernest R. Larkins, Double Tax Relief for Foreign Income: A Comparative
Study of Advanced Economies, 21 VA. TAX REV. 233, 273 (2001).
126. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, Territorial vs. Worldwide International Tax Systems:
Which is Better for the U.S.?, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 283, 290 (2007).
127. This is an oversimplification, since most countries adopting a territorial system in
reality have some form of hybrid system using anti-abuse or other rules to reach some foreign
income. See SUBPART F REPORT, supra note 41, at ix-xi.
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tax, while income earned from sales of cars in the Netherlands
would presumably be subject only to Dutch income tax.
The classic criticism of territorial taxation is that it encourages
tax rate competition because a taxpayer can choose how much tax
to pay simply by choosing in which jurisdiction to operate.128 Thus,
in the example above, assume the Netherlands has a much lower
rate of tax than Germany. In such a case, all else being equal, BMW
would have an incentive to sell cars in the Netherlands rather than
Germany, solely to save taxes.129 Correspondingly, to the extent the
Netherlands desired to attract tax base, it could do so by offering
lower tax rates than those in Germany. As a result, exemption is
often directly linked with tax competition.130
The connection between exemption and tax competition can be
seen by extrapolating the generic capital neutrality paradox to an
example where countries adopt territorial taxation. Assume a world
in which the United Kingdom is the equivalent of Country A, France
is the equivalent of Country B, and Gibraltar is the equivalent of
Country C. The United Kingdom exempts foreign source income
from U.K. income tax. France, having a sufficient domestic tax base
and sharing significantly in increased growth with the United
Kingdom, also adopts a territorial taxation system. Assume that as
a result Gibraltar is left with zero tax revenues per year, but a fixed
minimal revenue need to provide public goods. Adopting a territorial
taxation system would benefit worldwide economic growth, but the
benefit to the Gibraltar tax base would come only after the world-
128. See Martin Lobel, Territorial Taxation: An Invitation to Tax Avoidance and Evasion,
122 TAX NOTES 109, 109 (2009); Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive
Reform of the U.S. International Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 982 (1997)
[hereinafter Peroni, Back to the Future] (“[A]doption of the territorial system of taxation by
the United States would likely lead to increased tax competition by countries adopting tax
holidays or ineffective taxation at the source, thus undermining the fairness of international
taxation viewed from a global perspective.”). 
129. This assumes gain from the sale of inventory is sourced in the place of sale, which is
the rule in the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 865(b) (2006). It is for this reason that few countries
have “pure” territorial regimes, but rather adopt anti-abuse rules to prevent taxpayers from
artificially allocating income to a foreign jurisdiction solely to avoid tax. See supra note 127.
To the extent that actual business activity conducted outside the jurisdiction is not subject
to tax, however, the territorial regime could be considered to apply.
130. See, e.g., Michael J. McIntyre, Commentary, The Design of Tax Rules for the North
American Free Trade Alliance, 49 TAX L. REV. 769, 772-73 (1994) (“The source principle and
capital import neutrality foster and legitimize tax competition.”).
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wide capital grew sufficiently such that the marginal returns on
capital in both the United Kingdom and France equilibrated to less
than the marginal return on capital in Gibraltar, causing capital
and tax base to shift to Gibraltar.
In other words, the vast majority, if not all, of the expected
benefit from worldwide economic growth due to Gibraltar adopting
a territorial income taxation system would inure to the benefit of
the United Kingdom and France, with only minimal benefits to
Gibraltar. Gibraltar would then have to decide whether sufficient
tax base would inure to its benefit as a result of cooperation such
that it could meet its minimum tax revenue needs. Assuming this
would not be the case, Gibraltar would have no choice but to find
some other way to attract a sufficient tax base so as to raise its
minimum tax revenue.
One method would be to exploit the territorial taxation systems
of the United Kingdom and France by adopting a low or zero income
tax, with some method of raising revenue such as a franchise tax.
Since any income generated in Gibraltar would be exempt from tax
in both the United Kingdom and France, its taxpayers would pay a
much lower overall rate by relocating their tax base to Gibraltar,
resulting in higher after-tax profit, even for lower pre-tax economic
returns. In effect, the adoption of exemption by the United Kingdom
as a first mover would create a system in which France cooperated
but Gibraltar had the incentive to engage in tax competition in the
form of low or zero rates.
Presumably, Gibraltar would prefer to maintain a positive income
tax on its domestic tax base while also providing low rates to foreign
capital. This type of tax competition, often included in the definition
of ring-fencing,131 is by its own terms easy to identify and, conse-
quently, easy to punish—for example by denying exemption or
imposing a penalty on income earned in countries with ring-
fencing.132 If, however, the United Kingdom were to punish Gibral-
131. See, e.g., Yoram Keinan, The Case for Residency-Based Taxation of Financial
Transactions in Developing Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 62 (2008) (citing OECD, HARMFUL
TAX COMPETITION, supra note 10).
132. This is in fact the policy of U.S. tax law, which disallows a foreign tax credit for
countries that impose a different rate of tax on foreign investors eligible for a foreign tax
credit than on domestic capital. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(c)(1) (2010). See generally JOEL D.
KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, ¶ B4.03[5][C] (2009).
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tar for ring-fencing in this manner, the incentive for Gibraltar
would not be to cease competing over capital—since it would still
need to meet its minimum revenue needs—but rather only to stop
ring-fencing and shift the means of competing, for example, by
adopting a uniform low rate for all taxpayers in Gibraltar. Since
Gibraltar’s new rule would no longer discriminate on its face among
types of capital or investors, it would be much more difficult, if not
impossible, for the United Kingdom to punish Gibraltar; after all,
how could the United Kingdom punish its taxpayers for investing in
Gibraltar and paying the same rate of tax as local Gibraltar
taxpayers? Especially when, in fact, that was the precise intent of
the United Kingdom in adopting territorial exemption in the first
place? Even worse, the adoption of territorial exemption itself is
precisely what made the use of such rates an effective way to attract
capital. 
The result, however, would be that Gibraltar would raise even
less revenue from its domestic tax base, requiring even more
aggressive forms of tax competition to meet its minimum revenue
need.133 Further, if the United Kingdom or France were to punish
low rates generally, Gibraltar could then adopt aggressive forms of
income allocations, such as transfer pricing,134 to allow U.K. and
French investors to more cheaply and easily shift capital away from
their home countries.135 In other words, by adopting exemption the
United Kingdom and France created a baseline of tax competition
that effectively could not be punished, but was more harmful than
other more obvious forms of competition. 
133. See Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54
NAT’L TAX J. 757, 758 (2001); Sam Bucovetsky & Andreas Haufler, Tax Competition When
Firms Choose Their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be Closed?
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 1625, 2005).
134. Transfer pricing refers to a strategy of multinational taxpayers manipulating the price
it charges affiliates across borders to artificially allocate profits to low-tax jurisdictions and
away from high-tax jurisdictions. See generally KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 132, ¶ A3.01. For
example, if a widget costs $1 to make and would sell for $10 in the market, a U.S. company
would typically have $9 of income in the United States. Instead, however, the company could
sell the widget to an Irish affiliate for $2 rather than $10, resulting in a reduction of income
subject to tax in the United States, a high-tax jurisdiction, from $9 to $1. A subsequent sale
of the widget in the market by the Irish affiliate for $10 would result in $8 of income in
Ireland, a low-tax jurisdiction. By using transfer pricing, the company effectively shifted $8
of income away from the United States to Ireland.
135. See Bucovetsky & Haufler, supra note 133, at 24.
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2. Worldwide Tax Base, Credits, and Blending
The worldwide tax base, credits, and blending story is a little
more complicated than the territorial exemption story, but can also
powerfully demonstrate the potential explanatory strength of the
capital neutrality paradox. Assume the United States is the
equivalent of Country A, the United Kingdom is the equivalent of
Country B, and the Cayman Islands is the equivalent of Country C.
The United States taxes the worldwide income of its citizens and
residents while granting a credit for taxes paid to foreign govern-
ments. For example, assume a U.S. investor invests $1,000,000 in
the United Kingdom, the U.S. tax rate is 35 percent, and the U.K.
tax rate is 30 percent. The investment returns $100,000, which is
taxed at 30 percent in the United Kingdom. The investor pays the
United Kingdom $30,000 and brings back $70,000 to the United
States. The United States also taxes the investor on income of
$100,000 and imposes a tax of $35,000. Due to the tax paid to the
United Kingdom, however, the United States subtracts $30,000
from the $35,000 tax bill. Consequently, the investor pays the
United States an additional $5,000 and is left with an after-tax total
of $65,000—the same as if it had been a purely domestic invest-
ment.136
As discussed above, the well-documented problem with the
foreign tax credit regime is that, to be a pure model, the United
States would have to refund any foreign taxes in excess of the U.S.
tax rate.137 For example, if the United Kingdom imposed a 40
percent tax rather than a 30 percent tax, such that the investor paid
$40,000 to the United Kingdom, the United States would have to
actually pay the investor $5,000 to end up with an after-tax total of
$65,000, the same as if it had been a domestic investment; this
would effectively subsidize the United Kingdom in the interest of
“pure” capital neutrality.138 Since an unlimited foreign tax credit of
this type would eventually completely erode the tax base of a
country such as the United States, understandably no country has
136. $100,000 * (1 - .35) = $65,000.
137. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
138. See Roin, The Grand Illusion, supra note 89, at 929-30.
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adopted this approach; rather, the credit regimes are capped in
some manner.139
To this end, assume that the United States denies a foreign tax
credit for foreign taxes exceeding the total U.S. income tax liability
of a U.S. taxpayer on its worldwide income. Even though U.S.
taxpayers would pay no net income tax to the United States so long
as their foreign tax was equal to or greater than their U.S. tax
liability, it would be possible for their total tax liability to exceed the
U.S. tax rate. Under a simplistic analysis, the United Kingdom and
the Cayman Islands would adopt the highest possible tax rate so as
to maximize use of the credit—or raise revenue on foreign investors
at the expense of the U.S. Treasury—because the investor would be
indifferent to which country it pays the tax, so long as its total
worldwide tax liability is not greater than the what the domestic tax
would have been. Looking solely at the incentives for each country
on a bilateral basis with respect to the United States, assuming the
U.S. tax rate is 35 percent, the United Kingdom and the Cayman
Islands would each have the incentive to adopt a 35 percent tax
rate. In this manner, U.K. or Cayman taxes on U.S. taxpayers
would be fully offset by the U.S. foreign tax credit.
The problem with this analysis is that the United Kingdom and
Cayman Islands would not act purely on a bilateral basis with the
United States, but rather would also be competing with each other
to attract U.S. capital. Pursuant to the Lucas Paradox,140 however,
the United Kingdom would always provide a higher marginal return
on capital than the Cayman Islands; in effect, this grants the United
Kingdom a “first bite” at exploiting U.S. foreign tax credit capacity.
Consequently, even if the Cayman Islands were to adopt a 35
percent tax rate, it would still only attract capital on that amount
of U.S. investment in which the marginal return on capital in the
Cayman Islands exceeds the blended marginal return on capital in
the United States and the United Kingdom. This would leave the
Cayman Islands with little to no choice but to engage in tax com-
petition to meet its minimum revenue needs.141
139. See id.
140. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
141. The same analysis applies, but operationalized in a different manner, if the foreign
tax credit were limited to only “foreign source” income of U.S. taxpayers, rather than the total
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For example, if the U.S. corporate tax rate was 35 percent, the
United Kingdom would have no incentive to increase its tax rate
above 35 percent on U.S. investors since any excess would not be
credited in the United States and thus would distort investment in
the United Kingdom. However, assume that at least some countries
do have effective tax rates in excess of the U.S. effective corporate
tax rate.142 As a result, U.S. taxpayers could be left with an “excess”
foreign tax credit, meaning they paid taxes to foreign governments
that could not be used in the United States.143 The way for the
taxpayer to “free up” these excess foreign tax credits would be to
generate additional foreign source income that has less than the
U.S. effective tax rate imposed on it—the lower the effective foreign
tax, the more valuable the foreign source income becomes to U.S.
investors in excess credit positions.144
Under a simplified example, assume a U.S. investor pays $50,000
in foreign taxes on $100,000 of foreign income, and in addition has
$100,000 of income from a U.S. bank account. The investor owes tax
of $70,000 to the United States,145 but due to the “foreign source”
limitation on the foreign tax credit, can only claim as a credit taxes
against the $100,000 of “foreign” income, or $35,000. Thus, the
investor still owes an additional $35,000 of tax to the United States.
This $35,000, added together with $50,000 paid to the foreign
country, results in a worldwide total of $85,000 in taxes, as opposed
to $70,000 if the investment had been purely domestic.146
Assume instead that the investor earns the second $100,000 of
income from a bank account in the Cayman Islands, which charges
no income tax. The investor still owes $70,000 of taxes to the United
worldwide tax liability of U.S. taxpayers, which is in fact the current policy of the United
States. 26 U.S.C. § 904 (2006); see KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 132, ¶ A1.03[1].
142. The United States has historically had a relatively low effective corporate tax rate,
even in recent years when it has been at the higher end of the OECD member countries. For
a survey of statutory and effective corporate tax rates, see Peter R. Merrill, Competitive Tax
Rates for U.S. Companies: How Low To Go?, 122 TAX NOTES 1009 (2009).
143. This is generally referred to as an “excess” foreign tax credit. See Charles I. Kingson,
The Great American Jobs Act Caper, 58 TAX L. REV. 327, 341 (2005) (“Any amount of foreign
tax paid that exceeds the 35% needed to eliminate that U.S. tax on foreign income is referred
to as excess foreign tax credit.”).
144. See Avi-Yonah, Structure of International Taxation, supra note 42, at 1326-28.
145. $200,000 * 35% = $70,000.
146. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
2010] WHY ARE THERE TAX HAVENS? 971
States, but now has $200,000 of “foreign source” income instead of
$100,000 and can therefore claim up to $70,000 of foreign tax credit.
As a result, the investor can utilize the entire $50,000 of foreign
taxes paid to the United Kingdom as a credit and pay the United
States only an additional $20,000 of tax. Due solely to “creating”
low-taxed foreign source income by moving the bank account from
the United States to the Cayman Islands, the U.S. investor would
save $15,000 in total worldwide taxes. 
The above example is a simplified version of the classic “blending”
concern in the United States foreign tax credit regime, that is,
blending income from high-tax and low-tax countries to exploit the
foreign tax credit.147 The response in the United States has been to
deny the ability to blend income in this manner. The United States
has increased the effective tax rate for such investment by adopting
“baskets” of income that cannot be blended together.148 One such
antiblending mechanism would be a per-country basket, in which
credits for taxes paid to one country could not be used to offset taxes
arising with respect to income from other jurisdictions.149 For
example, under a per-country basket, the United States taxpayer
would not be able to “soak up” excess U.K. foreign tax credits with
Cayman Islands foreign source income, since only U.K.-sourced
income could be offset by U.K. foreign tax credits.150
At first glance, the per-country basket would seem to be a perfect
solution to the capital neutrality paradox; if taxes paid to the United
Kingdom could not be credited against income from the Cayman
Islands, then taxpayers could not play the blending game by moving
assets to the Caymans as a means to use excess U.K. foreign tax
credits. Such a conclusion assumes that tracing the source of income
to a particular country is feasible, or even has any economic salience
at all, which is unlikely.151 Even assuming this away, however, the
per-country approach misses the bigger problem with antiblending
147. See Robert J. Peroni, A Hitchhiker’s Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit
Limitation, 56 SMU L. REV. 391, 392-93 (2003) [hereinafter Peroni, Hitchhiker’s Guide].
148. 26 U.S.C. § 904(d) (2006).
149. See Peroni, Hitchhiker’s Guide, supra note 147, at 394-95.
150. See, e.g., Peroni, Back to the Future, supra note 128, at 996.
151. See Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, “What’s Source Got
To Do With It?” Source Rules and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 137-38
(2002).
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rules: not only do they prevent blending of income with income, but
they also prevent blending of losses with income. Consequently, the
per-country basket limitation simply increases the incentives for the
Cayman Islands to create or inflate special rules with respect to
deductions or losses rather than income, such as converting nonde-
ductible expenses into deductible ones, as a means to attract foreign
investment.152 In fact, this was the primary policy reason for the
repeal of the per-country limitation in the United States in 1976.153
Taken together, under the capital neutrality and punishment
paradoxes, regardless of the particular credit approach adopted by
countries such as the United States, the incentives to certain
countries to engage in tax competition would exist, not only through
cross-crediting but also through “soaking up” excess foreign tax
credits, blending losses, or other more complex techniques to lower
overall worldwide effective tax rate.154
III. HOW DID WE GET HERE? THE MOVE TO NEUTRALITY AND THE
RISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX PARADOXES
The lesson to be learned from the above analysis is that the
current regime of partly cooperative and partly noncooperative
dynamics should be thought of not simply as a temporary hurdle to
be overcome in pursuit of a common goal of neutrality and coopera-
tion, but rather as a structural component of the international tax
152. E.g., Treasury Dep’t, Business Taxation and Competitiveness, 116 TAX NOTES 399, 422-
23 (2007) (describing how a company with excess foreign tax credits could benefit by
converting nondeductible dividend payments into deductible royalty payments in the host
country).
153. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 236 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter 1976 BLUEBOOK] (“The use
of the per-country limitation often permitted a U.S. taxpayer who had losses in a foreign
country to obtain what was, in effect, a double tax benefit. Since the limitation was computed
separately for each foreign country, losses in any foreign country did not have the effect of
reducing the amount of credits allowed for foreign taxes paid in other foreign countries from
which other income was derived .... The Congress does not believe that taxpayers should be
permitted to obtain the double tax benefits described above. Accordingly, the per-country
limitation was repealed.”).
154. In addition to cross-crediting, there are numerous other means by which a credit
regime can create ways to utilize tax havens to create negative effective tax rates through tax
competition. See, e.g., James Kvaal, Removing Tax Subsidies for Foreign Investment, 111 TAX
NOTES 1299 (2006).
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regime perpetuating the capital neutrality and punishment
paradoxes. From this perspective, the tax haven issue facing the
international tax regime becomes potentially more difficult to
overcome, but also potentially more tractable in the long run. As
with any theory, however—especially one so at odds with received
wisdom—an analysis of whether and to what extent it better
explains the observed world can further its legitimacy. Part III will
do so, analyzing the development of some prominent anti-tax-haven
rules in the United States to determine not only whether the above
analysis is arguably based on more realistic assumptions than prior
models but also whether it more closely reflects the reality of the tax
haven experience.155
Prior to 1961, the United States treated the foreign income of U.S.
taxpayers very differently depending upon how the foreign income
was earned.156 Income earned directly by an individual or through
a branch of a domestic business was immediately included in the
income of the U.S. taxpayer and subject to the foreign tax credit,
which had already been in place for nearly fifty years,157 while
income earned through a foreign corporate subsidiary was not
subject to tax in the United States unless it was repatriated (for
example, through a dividend).158 Thus, U.S. investors could achieve
deferral of, and at times effective exemption from, U.S. taxes on
foreign earnings simply by choosing to operate their foreign
businesses or investments through a corporate form rather than as
a branch.159
155. Part III is neither intended to make a strong theoretical or empirical claim of proof
based on the experience of Subpart F nor to serve as a detailed legal historical analysis.
Rather, it is meant to demonstrate the robustness of the theory of the capital neutrality
paradox as consistent with historical experience. Reframing the history of anti-tax-haven
efforts could well be valuable as an independent goal but is outside the scope of this Article.
156. See KRAUSE & DAM, supra note 1.
157. 26 U.S.C. § 901 (2006). See generally ELISABETH A. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT
(1961) (discussing the foreign tax credit as it existed in 1961).
158. KRAUSE & DAM, supra note 1, at 6-7.
159. Id. at 7 (“By operating through a foreign subsidiary, a U.S. enterprise can avoid any
U.S. tax on the profits derived from the foreign operations until these profits are repatriated
to the United States.”); KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 132, ¶ B3.01. Even after the adoption of
Subpart F, this general statement remains true for a large percentage of foreign operations
of U.S. corporations. See generally id. ¶ B3.
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In 1961 the Kennedy Administration made this distinction a focus
of its tax policy reform initiative.160 Initially, the Kennedy Adminis-
tration proposed that all income earned by foreign corporations
owned by U.S. taxpayers be taxed immediately in the same manner
as if the corporation were a branch of the U.S. taxpayer.161 This
proposal was based primarily on the policies of treating businesses
operated through a branch and those operated through a corporate
subsidiary equally, and on removing certain tax benefits from
investing or operating offshore which, over time, could reduce the
overall tax base available to the United States.162
The proposal was changed substantially in Congress, where the
focus was more on “tax havens”—in other words, situations where
U.S. taxpayers simply parked assets offshore in a foreign corpora-
tion to avoid U.S. tax.163 It did so by amending the Kennedy proposal
to limit its application to focus on specific types of income, defined
as “Subpart F income,” which was the type of income that particu-
larly concerned Congress.164 Under this approach, U.S. persons who
owned a controlling interest in a foreign corporation would be
required to pay tax on such “bad” income earned by the foreign
corporation immediately, while “good” income could remain untaxed
until repatriated.165 
The history of Subpart F has commonly been described in these
terms, that is, as a compromise between proponents of complete
repeal of deferral and proponents of deferral as promoting competi-
tiveness of U.S. business operating abroad.166 Looked at more
160. See Kennedy’s Special Message, supra note 2, at 294-97.
161. See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of
Amnesty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 667, 683-84 (2007).
162. See Kennedy’s Special Message, supra note 2, at 295-96.
163. See S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 83 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3304, 3385-86
(“[The committee] sees no need to maintain the deferral of U.S. tax where the investments are
portfolio types of investments, or where the company is merely passively receiving investment
income. In such cases there is no competitive problem justifying postponement of the tax until
the income is repatriated.”).
164. See Boise, supra note 161, at 684.
165. See KUNTZ & PERONI, supra note 132, ¶ B3.03[1]; see also Lawrence Lokken, Whatever
Happened to Subpart F? U.S. CFC Legislation After the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX
REV. 185, 200 (2005) (“The essential compromise reflected in subpart F is an objective to curb
tax haven sheltering without denying tax deferral to income from active business operations
in low-tax countries.”).
166. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S.
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closely, however, it becomes clear that Subpart F was targeted less
at broad notions of horizontal equity and efficiency and more at
stopping specific abusive tax havens.167 Similarly, the legislative
history of Subpart F tends to focus more on abusive tax havens and
less on competitiveness more generally.168 
Interestingly, however, a significant portion of the history is often
missing from this traditional story.169 In particular, even in the
original Kennedy proposal, certain corporations were exempted from
the plan to tax all income of U.S.-controlled foreign corporations.170
These corporations—“less developed country corporations” (LDC
Corporations)—were those formed in a list of eligible less-developed
countries and engaged in certain business activities in those juris-
dictions.171 Notwithstanding the specific details of how these
International Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 329 (2005) (“It is common to assert that Subpart
F as enacted represented a compromise between CEN and competitiveness, in that the
Administration gave up on taxing CFCs on all of their income.”); Peroni, Stuck in the Middle,
supra note 123, at 1609-10.
167. This story has become accepted in the tax literature, although the effectiveness of
Subpart F to achieve this goal has been questioned. See, e.g., Lokken, supra note 165, at 187
(“[A] principal reason for the enactment of subpart F was to curb U.S. companies’ ability to
shelter income from taxation in tax haven countries.”); see also SUBPART F REPORT, supra note
41, at 22 (“Congress may thus have believed that by ending deferral only in the tax haven
context and with respect to passive income, it addressed the goals of equity and efficiency
without unduly harming competitiveness.”); Michael Stronberg, Tax Aspects of Doing Business
Abroad—Subpart F Income, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 153, 158 (1967) (citing 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N
3381).
168. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-1447, at 57-58 (1962).
169. There are some isolated references to these provisions, mostly in their repeal, but little
discussion as to how they fit into the larger history of Subpart F. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note
35, at 263, 275, 308. The history of these provisions is referenced in the SUBPART F REPORT,
however. See SUBPART F REPORT, supra note 41, at 21 n.38.
170. See Kennedy’s Special Message, supra note 2, at 296 (“At the same time, I recommend
that tax deferral be continued for income from investment in the developing economies. The
free world has a strong obligation to assist in the development of these economies, and private
investment has an important contribution to make. Continued income tax deferral for these
areas will be helpful in this respect.”). 
171. More specifically, a corporation was a LDC Corporation if it was formed in any country
identified by the President as a less-developed country, although Congress adopted a list of
countries that the President could not label as “less developed.” See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 90TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF H.R. 10650, at 58 (1967). The list
included the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom. Id. In addition, countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc were prohibited from being
considered LDCs. Id.
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provisions worked, the purpose of the LDC provisions was to effec-
tively subsidize investments in less-developed countries by explicitly
excepting them from the general rules and policies embodied in
Subpart F.172
The LDC Corporation exclusion survived the congressional
amendments to the Kennedy proposal and became an integral part
of the Subpart F regime as enacted in 1962.173 This regime did not
last long, however. By the early 1970s, observers increasingly
criticized the perceived inefficiency of the LDC Corporation pro-
visions,174 because these provisions distorted capital allocation
across borders.175 Ironically, this criticism was not based on the lack
of effectiveness of the LDC Corporation provisions, but rather on
their success, as the provisions had influenced the decision making
of U.S. corporations toward investing in less-developed countries.176
Critics of the LDC Corporation provisions noted that the argument
that such provisions could eventually lead to increases in United
States growth or tax revenue had not materialized to the extent
projected.177 In addition, the mechanisms adopted, including
deferral, gross-up relief, and ordinary income relief, were argued to
be too imprecise to achieve the desired incentives for investment in
such countries.178 
172. See SUBPART F REPORT, supra note 41, at 21 n.38 (“Although Congress did include
provisions within subpart F to promote investment in less developed countries, these
provisions were not intended to address competitiveness concerns but to encourage
development in these countries.”).
173. See Stronberg, supra note 167, at 164, 166-67.
174. See Alan G. Choate, Steven Hurok & Samuel E. Klein, Federal Tax Policy for Foreign
Income and Foreign Taxpayers—History, Analysis, and Prospects, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 441, 494-96
(1971).
175. Id.
176. See id. at 495; cf. 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 153, at 243 (“The Congress believes that
in the interest of uniform tax treatment between developed and less-developed country
corporations ... this double allowance should be removed.”).
177. Michael Stukenberg, The Effects of the 1975 Tax Reduction Act on the Taxation of
Subpart F Income, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 395 (1976).
178. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 218 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3113
(“The size of the tax benefit to the U.S. investor depends on a variety of factors, such as the
foreign tax rate in the country where the investment is made and in other countries, and the
capital gains tax rate in the United States. Further, the relationship of the tax benefits to the
investor to the benefits obtained by the developing country is erratic since the size of the tax
benefit may bear no relationship to the amount of development capital invested.”).
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Lastly, and what most seemed to puzzle policymakers at the time,
the countries themselves did not seem to be taking advantage of this
“gift” given to them by the United States.179 Since the provisions
adopted were mechanical, it was relatively simple to calculate an
optimal rate through which the less-developed countries could
maximize their domestic revenue and still exploit the benefits of the
LDC Corporation laws.180 Yet almost all less-developed countries
had been adopting rates significantly below this mathematically
ideal rate.181 This was pointed to as proof that less-developed
countries were incapable, politically or otherwise, of exploiting the
generosity of such provisions.182
As a result, by 1976 all of the LDC Corporation provisions were
repealed, with the result that almost all foreign corporations were
treated the same for purposes of Subpart F.183 This was done pri-
marily in the name of furthering “neutrality” so as to minimize
distortions to cross-border investment and thus increase worldwide
growth.184 The repeal of the LDC Corporation provisions was not
done in a vacuum, however, but rather acted to remove a benefit
from companies investing or operating in countries with lower
marginal returns on capital—effectively a punishment on investing
in poorer countries.185
179. See UNCTC, 1974 REPORT, supra note 22, at 33.
180. This rate turned out to be half of the United States rate. See 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra
note 153, at 243 (“The maximum tax differential ... occurred when the foreign tax was half
that [of the United States].”); UNCTC, 1974 REPORT, supra note 22, at 39, 40 (“It can be
shown that the minimum tax bill occurs when the LDC tax rate is exactly one-half the United
States rate.”).
181. See 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 153, at 243; UNCTC, 1974 REPORT, supra note 22, at
33.
182. See UNCTC, 1974 REPORT, supra note 22, at 33.
183. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-658, at 218, 230-31.
184. See 1976 BLUEBOOK, supra note 153, at 243; Stukenberg, supra note 177, at 395
(“Prevention of tax avoidance and ending deferral are the primary justifications offered for
the total elimination of the privilege of reinvestment of qualified income in an LDC.”).
Interestingly, by 1976 the second primary policy of the original Subpart F, creating incentives
for unaligned countries to affiliate with the United States rather than the Soviet Union,
seemed to disappear from the debate. This may be because the affiliations in the bipolar world
were perceived as solidified, or perhaps the need for unaligned countries seemed less
important in the 1970s. See Stukenberg, supra note 177, at 396 (“[I]t is difficult to see the
rationale for eliminating the LDC benefits unless the United States has decided to revoke its
long standing policy of encouraging the economic development of the Third World.”).
185. See Stukenberg, supra note 177, at 395-96 (“[I]t is foolish to speak of a ‘neutral’ tax
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Around the same time, the United States grew increasingly
concerned over the attempt by tax havens to attract U.S. investors
by exploiting the U.S. foreign tax credit provisions.186 In particular,
one of the primary concerns was the use of “soak-up” taxes, or taxes
imposed by foreign countries solely on U.S. investors and solely to
the extent the U.S. investor would be repaid by the U.S. government
through the foreign tax credit.187 In effect, soak-up taxes were
intended to have the U.S. Treasury indirectly subsidize the tax
haven.188 By the late 1970s, the IRS had identified soak-up taxes as
troubling, and in 1980 the Treasury Department issued new
Temporary and Proposed Regulations intended to address soak-up
taxes.189 By 1983, these regulations were modified to, among other
things, explicitly disallow a foreign tax credit for soak-up taxes, and
were then finalized and promulgated into law.190 Taken together,
policy between the LDC’s and the developed nations. Because of the inherent disincentives
to investing in LDC’s, removing the tax incentives creates a form of neutrality but at the cost
of accentuating inequality.”).
186. The issue of “treaty shopping” also arose around the same time. In particular, the use
of the Netherlands Antilles to access Eurobond markets exploded in the late 1970s as U.S.
investors discovered they could route investments to the Eurobond market through the
Netherlands Antilles and, due to the inheritance of the Netherlands tax treaty with the
United States, avoid most if not all taxes. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 11, at 379-83 nn.8-
9. Although at first some were ambivalent to, if not supportive of, this method of reducing
effective tax rates, this “treaty shopping” was eventually deemed so abusive that by the late
1980s the United States had withdrawn from the tax treaty with the Netherlands Antilles
and treaties with other similarly situated former European colonies. See Richard K. Gordon,
On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and Offshore Financial
Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 519 (2010) (“The treaty with the Netherlands Antilles, oddly,
was tolerated so that overseas investors could invest in the U.S. corporate debt market
without having to pay gross tax to the United States.”). Interestingly, although the use of the
Netherlands Antilles as a portal to the Eurobond market had effectively become moot due to
changes in the U.S. tax law, withdrawal from the treaty was justified at the time at least in
part as a form of punishment for tax haven behavior. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 11, at
382; Frith Crandall, The Termination of the United States-Netherlands Antilles Treaty: What
Were the Costs of Ending Treaty Shopping?, 9 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 355, 372 (1988).
187. In addition to soak-up taxes, the regulations attempted to address royalties disguised
as taxes, noncompulsory taxes, and indirect taxes such as sales taxes masquerading as income
taxes. See Marc M. Levey, Creditability of a Foreign Tax: The Principles, the Regulations, and
the Complexity, 3 J.L. & COM. 193 (1983).
188. Id. at 204 (“If a [soak-up tax] is imposed, Treasury would function as a funding agent
for the foreign government.”).
189. See Temporary Income Tax Regulations Relating to the Creditability of Foreign Taxes,
45 Fed. Reg. 75,647, 75,648 (Nov. 17, 1980) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 4); Creditability of
Foreign Taxes, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,695 (Nov. 17, 1980) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
190. See Creditability of Foreign Taxes, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,272, 46,280 (Oct. 12, 1983) (codified
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the repeal of the LDC Corporation provisions and the promulgation
of anti-soak-up tax rules significantly limited the benefit of
investing in what were perceived to be abusive tax havens by the
early 1980s.
What is particularly interesting is that there were tax haven
problems before the enactment of Subpart F and promulgation of
anti-soak-up rules, and there have been tax haven problems since,
notwithstanding that these provisions were adopted primarily with
the goal to put a stop to tax havens. Why have these efforts been so
ineffective? Under the punishment theory this does not make sense;
if being a tax haven is profitable, the solution must be to punish tax
havens to remove the profit. By removing deferral for some of the
most troubling tax haven activity, Subpart F served to punish U.S.
taxpayers investing in tax havens, while denying foreign tax credits
acted in much the same manner. Under the punishment theory,
these actions should have reduced the number of tax havens, the
amount of capital invested in tax havens, or both. Yet not only has
the number of countries acting as tax havens increased since the
enactment of Subpart F, but the total amount of capital residing in
these tax havens has exploded as well.191
Further, if punishing a particular tax haven was successful in
convincing that tax haven to cease harmful tax competition, the risk
of incurring such punishment should make it more costly for all
countries to engage in tax haven behavior,192 thus deterring other
countries from becoming new entrants into the tax haven business.
Yet the reality is that more countries act as tax havens now than in
1962,193 and more do so now than prior to the promulgation of the
at 26 C.F.R. pts.1 & 4); Foreign Tax Credit, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,641 (Apr. 5, 1983) (codified at 26
C.F.R. pts. 1 & 4.). Subsequently, the IRS continued to issue Revenue Rulings identifying
more aggressive and hidden versions of soak-up taxes within the tax codes of other countries.
See Rev. Rul. 2003-8, 2003-1 C.B. 290 (Costa Rica); Rev. Rul. 87-39, 1987-1 C.B. 180
(Uruguay).
191. See, e.g., Miller supra note 35, at 6-9 (citing sources estimating total lost tax revenue
of $11 billion to $60 billion per year); Martin A. Sullivan, Shifting of Profits Offshore Costs
U.S. Treasury $10 Billion or More, 104 TAX NOTES 1477, 1481 fig.3 (2004); see also supra note
34 and accompanying text.
192. Cf. Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is Uncertain,
27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 266 (2007) (explaining the role of the risk of detection within the
Bentham-Becker formula for the calculation of tax-evasion panalties).
193. See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT’L
ORG. 151, 151 (2002) (“Over the past three decades there has been a spectacular rise in the
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anti-soak-up tax regulations.194 The punishment theory narrative
cannot fully explain this development.
The capital neutrality and punishment paradoxes potentially
provide a better explanation for both these successes and failures,
however. First, the capital neutrality paradox would provide that
neutral tax laws would serve to increase incentives of poorer
countries to engage in tax competition. Subpart F, as initially
enacted, though, was not neutral; rather, Subpart F specifically
subsidized poorer countries through the LDC Corporation provi-
sions.195 Thus, Subpart F had two effects: First, it made it more
expensive to use then-traditional tax haven techniques through
historical tax haven jurisdictions such as Switzerland. Second,
Subpart F made it relatively cheaper to invest in other less-
developed countries.196 In effect, it “punished” countries engaged in
what was then deemed abusive tax haven behavior while “reward-
ing” those poorer countries that had not done so.
The repeal of the LDC Corporation rules changed this paradigm
by moving closer to neutrality and, effectively, punishing less-
developed countries by removing the tax subsidy for investment in
them. By punishing these countries in this manner, such countries
lost revenue, increasing the need to find alternative sources of
revenue. At the same time, demand by U.S. taxpayers—in particu-
lar large multinational corporations—for alternative means to
reduce worldwide tax liability increased as well, because the ability
to use LDC Corporations to this end had been repealed. As these
taxpayers moved to other means such as exploiting soak-up taxes,
these methods were also punished. In other words, as Subpart F
moved closer to neutrality, the incentives for poorer countries to
engage in tax competition increased.
number of microstates serving as tax havens.”). For the periods from 1968 to 1972, see
RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES TAXPAYERS 4-5 (1981).
194. See Boise & Morriss, supra note 11, at 426.
195. See Graetz, supra note 35, at 275 (“President Kennedy’s proposals were not neutral
between investments in developed and developing countries, offering a tax advantage to the
latter.”).
196. This can be thought of as a form of the classic “carrot and stick” approach to tax
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the
Multiplication Effect, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365, 366 (2010); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative
Tax Regulation, 41 CONN. L. REV. 431, 491 (2008) (“Currently, U.S. tax regulation relies too
heavily on sticks and not enough on carrots.”).
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What arose concurrently was a group of countries willing to “sell”
their jurisdictional sovereignty as a place to engage in such trans-
actions in exchange for minimal tax revenues—such as Bermuda for
insurance,197 the Cayman Islands for hedge funds,198 Luxembourg
for hybrid equity schemes,199 and even Nova Scotia for hybrid entity
schemes.200 Why any one country may have been successful at a
particular form of tax competition speaks to other factors,201 but the
incentive to engage in tax competition can well be attributed, at
least in part, to the move in Subpart F toward neutrality and
punishment.
Similarly, adoption of antidiscrimination rules such as the anti-
soak-up tax regulations pressured these countries to adopt uniform
rates of tax on all capital income.202 Since presumably these
jurisdictions could not attract or retain capital if they imposed
higher taxes on all investors, the result of such a nondiscrimination
rule was to pressure such countries to adopt low or zero tax rates on
all capital income, not just on that of U.S. investors. This, in turn,
further reduced the ability of these countries to meet their minimal
revenue needs, thereby increasing the pressure to turn to more
197. See, e.g., Daniel M. Crane & Linnsey K. Workman, Bermuda Triangle: Tax Havens,
Treaties, & U.S. P&C Insurance Competitiveness, 94 TAX NOTES 73, 78 (2002).
198. Martin A. Sullivan, Offshore Explorations: Caribbean Hedge Funds, Part 2, 118 TAX
NOTES 255, 255 (2008) (“[M]ore than half of the world’s hedge funds are legally domiciled
offshore, and the four offshore leaders are the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, the
Bahamas, and Bermuda.... And of those four, the Cayman Islands by a wide margin
dominates its competition.”).
199. See David Buss, David Hryck & Robert Rothman, Tax Minimization Strategies Using
Offshore Holding Companies, 83 TAXES 13, 14 (2005) (“There is also a special type of
instrument referred to as a ‘preferred equity certificate’ (PEC) which is treated as debt for
Luxembourg purposes but is usually treated as equity for U.S. tax purposes.”).
200. See, e.g., Peter H. Blessing, Cross-Border Acquisition Financing, 843 PLI/TAX 791,
855-56 (2008) (discussing FSA 200206010, which held the structure complied with U.S. tax
law). The United States and Canada recently entered into a new treaty protocol that would
substantially limit the benefit of such structures. See Philip F. Postlewaite, Stephanie R.
Hoffer & Matthew T. Kemp, The Adaptation of U.S. Tax Treaties to Changing Business
Forms—A Case Study of Hybrid Entities, 34 INT’L TAX J. 33, 40 (2008).
201. See Leibrecht & Rixen, supra note 19, at 70 (“[T]ax havens are in competition with
each other and with high-tax countries.”).
202. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.901-2(c)(2), ex. 1 (2009) (denying a foreign tax credit for special taxes
imposed by a foreign country on residents of only four other countries).
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aggressive forms of tax competition, making the entire system worse
off.203
Revisiting the history of anti-tax-haven efforts, including the
experience of the LDC Corporation provisions, can prove useful in
both learning the lessons of the past and in learning the limitations
of traditional theories of tax competition. Upon closer inspection,
this history demonstrates that the punishment theory is at best
incomplete. In its strongest form, the capital neutrality paradox
both better explains and better predicts the experiences with anti-
tax-haven efforts than does the traditional punishment theory of
tax havens. At a minimum, however, the history of anti-tax-haven
provisions more closely corresponds with the capital neutrality and
punishment paradoxes than with the punishment theory of tax
havens, making it at least useful to envision prescriptive solutions
to tax competition within the framework of these paradoxes and
how they contrast to those under the punishment theory of tax
havens. 
IV. TOWARD RESOLVING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX PARADOXES 
Given the dynamics of an international tax regime with the
capital neutrality paradox, as discussed above, it is not surprising
that traditional responses to competition in the international tax
arena, standing alone, could be insufficient or even counterproduc-
tive. What proves more difficult, however, is crafting better legal
rules in light of the capital neutrality paradox, precisely because the
real world is more complicated than the model. In this case, the
primary complication when extrapolating from the theory to crafting
appropriate prescriptions is the assumption of states as unitary
actors; of course, states are not human beings, but rather groups of
people making collective decisions, which themselves could be
subject to collective action, heuristics, interest groups, and other
problems.
Does this prove fatal to incorporating the capital neutrality
paradox into U.S. international tax law? Not necessarily; rather, it
counsels prudence in its application. The primary lesson that can be
203. See Keen, supra note 133, at 758.
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learned from the capital neutrality paradox is that neutrality and
cooperation may not be able to coexist in every particular circum-
stance. At a minimum, this lesson can help us question the long-
standing assumptions underlying the punishment theory of inter-
national tax, a theory that has underlined most anti-tax-haven
efforts. Further, it can prove valuable even given the limitations of
the unitary actor assumption in situations where the law focuses on
neutrality to reexamine if such a policy is negatively impacting
capital flows to developing countries. 
By identifying these situations, it can be possible to determine if
modifications to the pure neutrality policy could yield Pareto-
superior results.204 In other words, by relieving some of the pressure
of the capital neutrality paradox, tax competition could improve as
compared to current law even if some countries would act irratio-
nally due to internal politics or otherwise.205 To the extent current
policy prescriptions from the punishment theory rely on claims of
optimality, taking them seriously requires at a minimum consider-
ing alternatives under the capital neutrality paradox as well.
Such an approach is particularly relevant in light of the recent
debate over the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.206 The Act contains
numerous provisions that would change the treatment of both tax-
payers and tax havens, including new rules on information report-
ing, statutes of limitations, and penalties.207 The primary feature of
the Act, however, is to significantly increase punishment of tax
havens and the taxpayers who invest in them with the intent of
reducing harmful tax competition, based primarily on the punish-
204. For models of how fiscal transfers can optimize tax competition, see Thiess Buettner,
The Incentive Effect of Fiscal Equalization Transfers on Tax Policy, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 477, 493
(2006) (using the different tax rates in German municipalities to conclude that fiscal transfers
can produce an optimizing “incentive effect”); Carl Gaigné & Stéphane Riou, Globalization,
Asymmetric Tax Competition, and Fiscal Equalization, 9 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 901, 920
(2007) (concluding that, through tax revenue equalization schemes, fiscal transfers can yield
efficient outcomes even when countries lack cooperative tax policies).
205. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 432-33 (1988). 
206. H.R. 1265, 111th Cong. (2009).
207. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL, PART
THREE: PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER INCOME AND INVESTMENT
204, 218 (Comm. Print 2009).
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ment theory of tax havens.208 In light of the capital neutrality and
punishment paradoxes, however, the Act might not only be ineffec-
tive in squeezing tax competition out of the international system,
but could actually exacerbate the problem. In such a case, the very
terms of the debate over this legislation, and the prescriptive
solutions therein, need to be revisited and revised so as to avoid
unintentionally increasing tax competition—a common goal of
virtually all traditional international tax analysis to one degree or
another.209
This does not mean that punishment could not be the appropriate
prescription in a particular solution, or that it is mutually exclusive
with whatever prescriptions might derive from the capital neutral-
ity paradox. In fact, assuming a viable solution to the capital
neutrality paradox would relieve some of the pressure on the
minimum revenue needs of the poorest countries in the world,
both the effectiveness and normative appeal of punishment for
recalcitrant jurisdictions would be strengthened as well.210 This
could be thought of as a form of “punishment plus” theory—that not
only is punishment appropriate or necessary in certain circum-
stances when combined with the prescriptions under the capital
neutrality paradox, but that it can also be defended more strongly
from both an efficiency and normative standpoint.211
Since the capital neutrality paradox arises when the assumption
of limited direct fiscal transfers is introduced, presumably one of the
208. See H.R. 1265 (stating that the purpose of the Act is “[t]o restrict the use of offshore
tax havens and abusive tax shelters to inappropriately avoid Federal taxation”).
209. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 10, at 56-57. But see Infanti, supra
note 45, at 1151-52; Qing Hong & Michael Smart, In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax
Planning and Foreign Direct Investment 17 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1942, 2006), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976577.
210. See David G. Noren, Commentary, The U.S. National Interest in International Tax
Policy, 54 TAX L. REV. 337, 339-40 (2001) (“Whatever one thinks of the severity and immediacy
of this problem, it seems clear that some combination of tax and regulatory carrots and sticks
will have to be deployed to keep this business activity and the tax dollars therefrom connected
with major destination markets like the European Union and the United States.”); cf. Robert
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 595 (1998) (“In reality, a
combination of expression and coercion accounts for the effectiveness of many laws.”).
211. Broadly speaking, in the terminology of the traditional equity/efficiency tradeoff,
“punishment plus” could be thought to increase efficiency because it improves incentives
toward worldwide efficient allocation of resources and normative because it takes distribution
of resources into account. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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easiest ways to overcome the capital neutrality paradox would be to
use direct fiscal transfers,212 not to reward tax competition or bribe
countries to cooperate,213 but as a means to satisfy the minimum
revenue needs of tax havens and thus remove these particular
incentives to tax competition from the system.214 In other words, tax
competition acts as an inefficient form of fiscal transfer that could
be replaced with a more efficient form.215 Direct fiscal transfers are
unlikely to serve as a complete answer to overcoming the capital
neutrality paradox, however, due to a number of reasons, including
domestic political opposition and fear of foreign corruption and
waste.216 Notwithstanding these limitations, approaches similar to
direct fiscal transfers have begun to be proposed in the literature
under certain circumstances, and are worthy of consideration in
their own right, even if they may have limited utility in directly
overcoming the capital neutrality paradox.217
212. This concept is contrary to the notion of using “tax expenditures” as incentives to
effectuate governmental policy. Cf. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for
Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83
HARV. L. REV. 705, 707 (1970).
213. Cf. Joseph Guttentag & Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Closing the International Tax Gap, in
BRIDGING THE TAX GAP: ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 106 (Max
B. Sawicky ed., 2005) (proposing that developed countries offer “transition support” to tax
havens that cease competitive behavior).
214. This is because two fundamental assumptions underlie the capital neutrality paradox:
(1) minimum revenue needs, and (2) limited direct international fiscal transfers. See supra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Overcoming either assumption would therefore mitigate
the capital neutrality paradox.
215. See Wildasin, supra note 108, at 194; see, e.g., Martin A. Sullivan, The IRS
Multibillion-Dollar Subsidy for Ireland, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 137-3 (July 18, 2005).
216. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 109-6, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41; Avi-Yonah, International Redistribution, supra note 23, at
374 (“[A]n increase in the official aid to the level required ... is not in the cards.”); Jacquelyn
S. Porth, Corruption Undermines Trust, Erodes Development, AMERICA.GOV, May 19, 2009,
http://www.america.gov/st/business-english/2009/May/20090424141654sjhtrop0.950741.html.
Although outside the scope of this Article, one potential benefit of using tax law for indirect
transfers is that revenues should theoretically flow to the most stable and least corrupt of the
poorer countries, as they would be the most marginally attractive for foreign capital. Cf.
Dharmapala & Hines, supra note 17, at 1065 fig.2.
217. See Dean, supra note 18, at 963-65 (proposing that the United States enter into tax
flight treaties with certain jurisdictions to divide the incremental revenue resulting from tax
information exchange agreements); Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax Treatment of Foreign
Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy Analysis, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 265, 274 (2003) (proposing a gross-up and tax credit for certain deemed-paid taxes to
developing countries); Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards
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Assuming direct fiscal transfers are not possible, indirect fiscal
transfers need to be considered as one potential avenue to overcome
the capital neutrality paradox.218 At least one political economy
model has explored this possibility, concluding that it could be
Pareto-optimal for a wealthy country to grant a refundable credit to
its taxpayers for taxes paid to a poorer country as a means of fiscal
transfer.219
In many ways, this approach is similar to the historic practice of
“tax sparing” typically considered in connection with tax policy with
respect to poorer countries. Tax sparing refers to the concept that a
home country should grant a tax credit to its taxpayers for taxes
that would have been imposed by a host country absent some tax
incentive.220 For example, assume Malawi generally imposed a 25
percent income tax on capital investment but offered to reduce the
tax to 10 percent for a U.S. investor. Under current foreign tax
credit rules, the U.S. investor would be eligible for a credit of only
10 percent; under tax sparing, however, the investor would be
eligible for a credit of 25 percent notwithstanding that only 10
percent was in fact imposed. In this manner, the United States can
subsidize investment in poorer countries while permitting the host
country to use its tax policy to attract capital investment.
Although at first tax sparing appears similar to the concept of
indirect fiscal transfers, they are conceptually distinct. First, and
primarily, tax sparing has generally been promoted not as a means
to improve the U.S. tax system on its own terms, but rather to
further unrelated normative goals of development or distributive
justice.221 Second, tax sparing has generally been considered in
Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 331,
337-41 (2003) (discussing promise and limitations of Tax Information Exchange Agreements
like the one between the U.S. and Barbados); see also Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the
Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555 (2007).
218. See generally Wildasin, supra note 108.
219. See Keen & Wildasin, supra note 58, at 270.
220. See Dean, supra note 18, at 930 n.85.
221. See Karen B. Brown, Transforming the Unilateralist into the Internationalist, in
TAXING AMERICA 214, 225 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (“The failure
of the United States to accept the tax sparing credit has derailed many developing country
treaty negotiations.”). By way of contrast, recent work has proposed a form of tax sparing to
be used to optimize the income tax system by equalizing the treatment of explicit and implicit
host country taxes. See generally Knoll, supra note 107. 
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connection with bilateral treaty negotiations as a sort of bargaining
chip for poorer countries to enter into treaties with wealthier
countries, although there is a legitimate debate as to the utility of
such a use for tax sparing provisions.222 Lastly, the United States
has never enacted tax sparing with another country,223 and those
countries that have, such as Canada, are reconsidering the effective-
ness of doing so.224
One question that arises, however, is whether tax sparing could
be used as a tool to overcome the capital neutrality paradox notwith-
standing its historical justifications.225 The historical experience
with tax sparing in other jurisdictions does not bode well for the
effectiveness or usefulness of such an approach.226 Perhaps more
importantly, tax sparing requires poorer countries to lower tax rates
to receive the benefits. Thus, tax sparing could potentially exacer-
bate the two paradoxes for countries on the margin of their mini-
mum revenue needs, because lowering effective tax rates could
result in dropping total revenue below minimal revenue needs.
Taken together, given the historical experience, the bluntness of the
approach to the capital neutrality paradox, and the normative
associations with tax sparing, this Article will consider other more
tailored alternatives.
Assuming tax sparing is either an ineffective or unrealistic option
for overcoming the capital neutrality paradox, one of the simplest
alternatives presumably would be to revive the LDC Corporation
provisions of Subpart F,227 providing U.S. taxpayers a significant
222. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low-
Income Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN’S L.J. 505, 552-53, 556
(2009). 
223. See Brown, supra note 221, at 225.
224. See Brooks, supra note 222, at 530.
225. See McDaniel, supra note 217, at 274-76 (proposing a unilateral tax credit for certain
developing countries).
226. For example, due to the significant worldwide efficiency costs and potential for abuse,
the use of tax sparing has fallen into disfavor even in countries initially highly supportive of
the concept, such as Canada. See, e.g., Deborah Toaze, Tax Sparing: Good Intentions,
Unintended Results, 49 CAN. TAX J. 879, 892-93 (2001); see also Kim Brooks, Canada’s
Evolving Tax Treaty Policy Toward Low-Income Countries, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE IMPACT
OF TAX ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 15 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., forthcoming), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352647; Robert J. Peroni, Response to Professor McDaniel’s
Article, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 297, 299-300 (2003).
227. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
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incentive to retain and reinvest earnings in less-developed countries
and leading to a greater domestic tax base in these countries.228 In
this manner, less-developed countries would be able to build or
retain a greater independent capital tax base, relieving pressure on
the need to engage in tax competition.
To the extent that (and in the unlikely world where) the repeal of
the LDC Corporation provisions provided a robust explanation for
the rise of tax havens, reenactment of the LDC Corporation pro-
visions would be an ideal response. After all, if repealing the LDC
Corporation provisions caused the rise of the tax havens, then
reinstating them should mitigate the problem. Even assuming this
strong causation story is not the case, which seems more likely, such
a proposal has many benefits. First, it is not novel, meaning that the
uncertainty with respect to implementing it would not be as great
as proposals created anew. Although the impact on capital would be
different in the modern financial world than in 1962, the adminis-
trative costs at a minimum would presumably be lower than other
proposals due to this historical experience with such provisions.229
Further, the primary criticisms at the time of the repeal of the LDC
Corporation provisions—that they caused revenue loss by transfer-
ring revenue from the United States to less-developed countries for
little competitive or distributive benefit—would be less relevant in
a world of the capital neutrality paradox because that cost would be
offset by reducing the incentives for eligible countries to engage in
tax competition. At a minimum, the fiscal impact of such proposals
228. See, e.g., Joosung Jun, U.S. Tax Policy and Direct Investment Abroad, in TAXATION IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 55, 57-58 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990). Alternatively, the
proposal could be expanded to permit movement of retained earnings between any LDC
Corporations such that capital would not be “trapped” in any one less-developed country. I
discuss a proposal with a similar effect in the different context of international tax arbitrage
transactions. See generally Rosenzweig, supra note 217.
229. Perhaps the most difficult task will be drafting the list of eligible less-developed
countries. This in itself, however, did not prove fatal to the operation of the LDC Corporation
provisions themselves. Not only was there little controversy over the list of countries, there
is nothing in the legislative history indicating that drafting the list was a reason behind its
repeal. See supra Part III. Further, the OECD has had no problem drafting a list of tax
havens for purposes of punishing harmful tax competition, which seems to indicate that, at
a minimum, it is not beyond the abilities of the United States to do so as well. See OECD,
HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, supra note 10, at 57. Lastly, targeting tax relief to certain poorer
countries is already an embedded feature of current U.S. tax law in other contexts. See
Rosenzweig, supra note 217, at 604 n.98 and accompanying text.
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would need to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis rather than
dismissed as necessarily and always revenue-reducing under a
neoclassical theory of tax competition.
The other primary criticism of the LDC Corporation provisions at
the time was that they were too blunt an instrument to achieve the
desired goals.230 That is, by exempting LDC Corporations from
certain antideferral and gross-up provisions, the law explicitly
subsidized investment in such countries but in a manner un-
calibrated to the amount of increased investment in such countries
or the benefits derived therefrom.231 The issue for the modern
debate, therefore, is whether these provisions could be reenacted in
a more tailored manner so as to more directly accomplish the new
policy goal of mitigating the incentives toward tax competition. This
is where the LDC Corporation provisions begin to appear less
promising, and perhaps more importantly seem to indicate the
inaptness of Subpart F as a tool to overcome the capital neutrality
paradox. If deferral and gross-up relief are too blunt, then what else
could be accomplished within the confines of Subpart F, a provision
specifically focused on deferral and gross-ups? This likely proves
critical to the utility of LDC Corporation provisions as a means to
combat tax havens, or at a minimum makes them less than ideal as
compared to other more direct proposals.232
Could there be such better options within the confines of the
Internal Revenue Code? This Article contends the answer is yes—so
long as assumptions about the mechanics of certain “unrelated”
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code could be reimagined. One
such option could be to create a more narrowly tailored indirect
fiscal transfer within the international tax rules of the Code, but
outside of Subpart F. For several reasons, one of the most promising
would be to build an indirect fiscal transfer into the existing foreign
tax credit basket rules.233 Although the use of foreign tax credit
baskets to achieve fiscal transfers as a means to overcome the
capital neutrality paradox may strike some as odd, the use of the
230. See supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
232. See McDaniel, supra note 217, at 291-92.
233. See 26 U.S.C. § 904 (2006) for existing foreign tax credit rules. 
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basket rules to achieve the goal of minimizing tax havens is not
novel.234
The mechanics of using the basket rules to this end could be done
by returning to a methodology formerly utilized by the United
States—the per-country limitation. As discussed in Part II, the use
of per-country basket limitations effectively prevent taxpayers from
“blending” income from high-tax and low-tax countries as a means
to “free up” excess foreign tax credits from wealthier countries. The
limitations permit taxpayers to claim a credit for foreign taxes only
against U.S. taxes owed on the same income, which is otherwise
possible under the existing “income type” basket rules.235 By doing
so, however, the per-country basket puts pressure on poorer
countries to utilize loss or deduction rules to accomplish the same
goal, that is, to use the tax laws to attract tax base.236 As a result,
there is no one perfect basket rule in a nonharmonized international
tax regime.237
Given this, one possibility could be to utilize the foreign tax credit
baskets not solely within the context of the credit, but rather within
the broader international tax laws of the United States as a whole.
In particular, under the per-country basket system, the law could
lift the cap on the ability to claim foreign tax credits for taxes paid
to a list of certain less-developed countries. In this manner, rather
than serve as an overall limit on the ability to claim foreign tax
credits as a means to protect the U.S. fisc, the per-country basket
would serve to make it relatively easier to use foreign tax credits
generated in less-developed countries and relatively harder to use
credits generated in developed countries.238 In effect, the United
States would indirectly subsidize income taxes imposed in such
234. For example, adopting antiblending rules such as the per-country basket was one of
the defensive measures recommended by the OECD. See OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION,
supra note 10, at 40-43.
235. See supra Part II.C.2. It is for this reason that the basket rules have been the focus
of many anti-tax-haven proposals as well. See JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX
HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 26 (2009).
236. See supra Part II.C.2; see also Julie A. Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic
World with Disparate Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1768 n.53 (1995) [hereinafter Roin,
Rethinking Tax Treaties] (“[O]ther source countries may find it beneficial to maintain low tax
rates to attract investors who would otherwise find themselves in an ‘excess credit’ position.”).
237. See Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties, supra note 236, at 1768-80.
238. See 26 U.S.C. § 904.
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jurisdictions, while the overall limitation on foreign tax credits to
“foreign source” income would remain,239 protecting the United
States from unabated raiding of the fisc by other countries.240
For example, assume the United States permits a tax credit for
taxes paid to a foreign country. NewCo, a U.S. corporation, sells
software in Industria, a relatively wealthy nation, at a profit of
$200. The United States treats the $200 as income subject to a U.S.
tax of 35 percent for a total tax liability of $70, less any available
foreign tax credit. Industria imposes a tax of 40 percent on the $200
profit, resulting in a total of $80 in tax. Taken together, NewCo is
left with $10 of excess, useless foreign tax credit. As discussed
above, the incentive of NewCo is to “free up” this credit by generat-
ing some profit in a low-tax country.241 This in turn puts pressure on
poorer countries to lower tax rates as a means to attract this
investment. Thus, assume that in addition to Industria with a tax
rate of 40 percent there was a third country, Island, with a tax rate
of 30 percent. If NewCo could treat $100 of income as arising in
Island, it would now have a total $200 of foreign source income but
foreign tax of only $70 ($40 in Industria plus $30 in Island),
meaning that it could now fully utilize its foreign tax credit.
The per-country basket rules would prevent this type of blending
of foreign income. Under the per-country basket, NewCo would have
to make two separate calculations to determine its U.S. tax. First,
it would calculate a total tentative tax liability in the United States
of $70. Second, with the per-country basket it could not necessarily
claim all $70 of foreign tax credit to reduce its U.S. tax to zero.
Rather, it could only use the $30 of Island credit against U.S. taxes
on the $100 of income earned in Island—that is, $35 of taxes—and
$40 of credit against the $35 of U.S. taxes on the $100 earned in
Industria. As a result, $5 of the Industria credit would remain
unused while NewCo would owe an additional $5 of taxes on the
Island income to the United States, for a total of $75 in taxes and a
$5 “excess” foreign tax credit.
But what if the tax credit for Island were unlimited? In such a
case, NewCo would much prefer that Island taxes be 40 percent and
239. Id.
240. See Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties, supra note 236, at 1768 n.53.
241. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
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Industria taxes be 30 percent rather than the other way around. If
NewCo paid $30 to Industria subject to the basket, it would be able
to claim all of the credit against $35 of U.S. tax, while the $40 of
taxes paid to Island would be fully creditable against all the foreign
income of NewCo. Since NewCo would still owe $40 of U.S. tax on
its $200 of foreign income, it could use the foreign tax credit to offset
all of the remaining U.S. tax, resulting in a total of $70 in taxes and
no “excess” foreign tax credit. In other words, such an approach
would effectively permit a form of “one-way” or “reverse” blending
of income for foreign tax credit purposes.
In this manner, by shifting the rules to adopt an unlimited basket
for developing countries and a limited basket for developed coun-
tries, the incentives of U.S. taxpayers would shift from pressuring
poorer countries to engage in tax competition under current law to
one of pressuring wealthier countries to impose lower tax rates and,
remarkably, for poorer countries to impose higher tax rates.
Assuming there is a limit on the amount that developed countries
can reduce their tax rates due to their spending commitments,242 the
pressure primarily will be on poorer countries to raise their rates
from zero or near zero to positive, solely to free up tax credits.
As a result, by unilaterally amending the basketing rules for the
foreign tax credit, the United States can dramatically change the
incentives of U.S. capital, and consequently, tax competition for
capital. This would reduce the incentives for poorer countries to
engage in tax competition. Rather than serve to “reward” bad
behavior, or insist on a harmonized world regime, or surrender to
the inevitability of tax competition, the law in this manner could
internally harmonize its moving parts solely on its own terms (with
respect to the incentives it creates), regardless of how or whether
other countries react.
Further, by using the foreign tax credit basket rules and main-
taining the general limits on foreign tax credit, such as the foreign
source income requirement, the total neutrality of the system as to
capital between the United States on the one hand and foreign
investment on the other would be no worse than under current
242. See Benshalom, supra note 96, at 647 (“While developed countries compete for capital
investments by lowering taxes, they are limited in doing so by their need for revenues to cover
governmental expenditures.”).
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law.243 In other words, a partial unlimited foreign tax credit basket
would not provide any incentive for more capital to leave the United
States as a whole than already exists under current law, assuming
taxpayers already maximize the ability to create foreign source
income and blend income across jurisdictions under current law.244
Further, the existing limitations on abuse such as the anti-soak-up
and other nondiscrimination rules would remain in place as well,
meaning these methods would also be no worse under the basket
proposal than under current law.245 Consequently, under these
assumptions, amending the foreign tax credit basket in this manner
should have little to no cost to the domestic tax base, but would
ameliorate some of the incentives created within U.S. tax law
toward tax competition. This makes intuitive sense as well—if tax
havens continue to offer effectively zero tax rates after adopting this
rule, allowing an unlimited foreign tax credit becomes irrelevant
since they are charging no taxes. On the other hand, if tax havens
effectively raise rates in response, the undesirable behavior would
be mitigated.
Finally, the administration of such a rule should prove much
simpler than other provisions targeted at developing countries
because qualification for the foreign tax credit requires the provision
of a receipt or comparable documentation from the foreign country
proving actual payment of a tax upon request from the IRS,246
meaning the obligation is on the taxpayer to prove entitlement
rather than on the government to trace and audit “abusive”
behavior as with tax sparing, LDC Corporation provisions, and
other similar provisions.247 If compliance was of a particular
concern, however, receipts or other documentation could be required
243. Id. at 647-48.
244. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 217, at 567 n.19. See generally Michael P. Devereux
& Harold Freeman, The Impact of Tax on Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Evidence and
the Implications for Tax Integration Schemes, 2 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 85 (1995) (concluding
that taxation does affect the location of outward foreign direct investment); Harry Grubert
& John Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. Corporations Invest?, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 825 (2000)
(concluding that capital movement is very responsive to taxes).
245. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
246. See 26 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.905-2(a)(2) (2010).
247. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 217, at 267-73.
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to be submitted to the IRS by the taxpayer in advance as a prerequi-
site to granting the unlimited foreign tax credit basket.248
Lastly, to effectuate the “punishment plus” theory, the basketing
approach should be combined with an anti-tax-haven effort of some
sort. In other words, to ensure that countries eligible for the
unlimited basket provisions would not continue to engage in
harmful tax competition, ceasing or modifying tax haven behavior
could be a prerequisite for a country to be included on the eligible
list. For example, eligibility for the list could be conditioned upon a
jurisdiction not engaging in bank secrecy or other forms of support
for money laundering or tax evasion. Taken together, adoption of
the unlimited basket provisions would serve to offset the incentive
currently built into U.S. law for poorer countries to engage in tax
haven behavior, while punishment in the form of ineligibility for
continued tax competition would weed out jurisdictions that might
continue their harmful tax haven behavior notwithstanding the
removal of the incentive due to path dependence,249 institutionali-
zation of tax competition, domestic political economy reasons, or
other reasons. Regardless, since the punishment would be inte-
grated with the basketing proposal, the punishment paradox would
be mitigated because the incentives created by both the baseline
rules and the punishment rules under U.S. law would, for the first
time, be unified toward cooperation.
This is not to say that such a basketing proposal is the only or
even the best approach to mitigating the capital neutrality paradox
or deterring countries from acting as tax havens. For example, a
similar rule could be implemented by adopting a per-country basket
and permitting zero-sourcing of deductions to the eligible
countries.250 Rather, the basketing proposal is an example of how
rethinking the manner in which seemingly disparate provisions of
the international tax laws might work together to create perverse
incentives can lead to dramatically different ways to thinking about
248. This was in fact proposed by the Treasury Department for foreign tax credits
generally, but was withdrawn as overbroad. See T.D. 8759, 1998-13 I.R.B. 19-20; see also
I.R.S. Notice 88-65, 1988-1 C.B. 552.
249. See, e.g., Rosenzweig, supra note 217, at 567 n.18.
250. This would effectively create more foreign tax credit capacity in the poorer countries
and less in the wealthier countries, similar to the basketing proposal. For the current rules
on sourcing of deductions, see 26 C.F.R. § 1.861-8.
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other areas such as Subpart F to create unified incentives. By
approaching international tax law in this manner, the law could
move closer to breaking the seemingly never ending cycle of
combating tax havens once and for all.
CONCLUSION
This Article directly addresses the question, “why are there tax
havens?” Surprisingly, although there has been a fair amount of
literature on why tax havens are harmful to the modern interna-
tional tax regime, which countries become tax havens, and what
means are available to combat tax havens, there has been little
written specifically on this underlying theoretical question.
Although at first this seems like an exceedingly obvious question—
tax havens exist because countries use their tax laws to attract
business—the literature has fairly well established that this must
be either incorrect or irrational. So are tax havens merely acting
contrary to their own long-term economic and fiscal interests,
possibly captured by special interest groups who are indifferent to
the harms they are imposing on the world, or is some other underly-
ing phenomenon at play?
This Article contends that the inability to answer this question
can be attributed to the failure to identify the hidden underlying
principle of international tax law: the “capital neutrality paradox.”
Under the capital neutrality paradox, it is precisely the focus of
modern international tax laws in wealthier countries such as the
United States on increasing the mobility of capital across borders
that creates or exacerbates the conditions necessary for tax havens
to arise and persist within the international regime. The capital
neutrality paradox arises because of the empirical reality that
capital flows disproportionately away from poorer countries to
wealthier countries. Taking this fact into consideration, a world that
encourages capital to flow freely across borders would result in
poorer countries with scarce domestic tax bases having little choice
but to engage in tax competition to meet their minimum revenue
needs. To the extent this is the case, punishing such countries would
almost always prove counterproductive because it would only
exacerbate this need to engage in tax competition. Understanding
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the “punishment paradox” in connection with the “capital neutrality
paradox” together can fundamentally alter the way in which the law
conceptualizes and responds to the issue of tax havens.
Confronting the issue of tax competition from this combined
perspective, it is the focus on neutrality and punishment in inter-
national tax law that comes into question. Consequently, contrary
to the punishment trend embraced both in the United States and
through organizations such as the OECD and G20, when faced with
a particular tax haven problem the best solution may well be to first
look inward to harmonize the tax laws of countries such as the
United States and the incentives they create to poorer countries,
and only then pursue punishment as an option. In effect, rather
than ask the question “why are there tax havens?” the question
would become “why pursue capital neutrality?” Rather than ask
“what can we do to punish tax havens?” the question would become
“would punishment be effective?” Such an approach could not only
lead to a more efficient international tax regime for all countries
involved, but could be the first step to finally answering the
question of why there are tax havens as well.
